the ALTERNATIVE

April, 1973 Volume 6 Number 7 Price (.25)

Harry S. Truman:

Examining the Foreign Policy of Apple Pie



Charles S. Hyneman

State and Local Authority vs. Federal Domination

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the ALTERNATIVE

to bare the witness and the truth

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Published remarkably without regard to race, color, creed, or (most redundantly of all) national origin — and yes, sex, even sex.

Editor in Chief: R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
Publisher: Baron Von Kannon of the Saturday Evening Club
Circulation and Promotion: Ronald E. Burr
Managing Editor: Neil Howe
Assistant Managing Editor: Joyce Goldberg
Senior Editors: Terry Krieger ☐ William Kristol Rev. George Nathan
Literary Editor: Roger Rosenblatt
Associates: David Brudnoy ☐ Jameson G. Campaigne, Jr. Doug Cooper ☐ John R. Coyne, Jr. ☐ James Grant Peter Hughes ☐ Joseph A. Morris ☐ Roger D. Tyrrell
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Alien Contributors: Eric Brodin ☐ Carl Miller ☐ Judy Tyrrell
Art Director: Elliott Banfield
Art: Gustave Doré ☐ Eric Lohnaas

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☆The Continuing Crisis☆

●What a month it was. The Nixon Regime tried to pull a fast one on the whole world by brainwashing 163 American POWs in the time it took to fly them from Hanoi to Clark Field in the Philipines, but the government's efforts were scotched by Mr. Robert C. Maynard, ombudsman for the valiant *Washington Post*. Displaying that acuity which has made progressive elements of the American press the marvel of the world, Maynard explained that the POWs were actually reading from a script prepared well in advance by none other than the Pentagon! Other worthies like Madam Van Horne, woman of letters for *The New York Post*, also inhaled a fishy fragrance wafting from the POWs' recitations. Nevertheless, many gullible Americans were probably duped by the POWs into thinking America really is "the greatest country on earth" or "the land of the free." In fact, were it not for vigilant members of the intelligentsia like Pete Hamill and the saintly Father Philip Berrigan, possibly even the Community of Conscience would have been duped by the government propaganda. Berrigan and Hamill pierced the jingoistic fog to remind the Community of Conscience that these POWs were really war criminals and murderers.

●The peace agreed to in South Vietnam by all combatants continued to rage. American troop withdrawals continued, and on February 21 a cease-fire was signed in Laos. From it the communists received at least one-fifth more of the country and the neutralists and rightists received a two day respite in the fighting before the war and diplomacy continued. Canada is reviewing its ban on hanging. And in the most recent of a rash of ecdysiastic exhibitions in Britain's progressive classrooms a lecturer at Brooklands Technical College was reprimanded for performing a striptease during one of his lectures, "A Version of Being A Woman." Further indications of enlightened British educational policy are manifest in The Education Ministry's decision to begin sex education for five-year-olds. But then there is the grim case of Mr. Dom McKenna, the bar tender at London's Nightingale tavern, who is leading a group of reactionary tavern keepers in demanding that the government bring back the death penalty for barroom murderers and corporal punishment for violent customers. Finally a dispatch from Ethiopia disclosed that Princess Anne was actually sitting on a mule while traveling from Sankaber to Geech!

●Back in the states, an aide for The Agency for International Development heatedly denied the claim by Senator Fulbright that it had sent pink bidets to Cambodia. According to a "leak" from the Senator's office, the Senator

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Editorial

The Other America

There seems to be some disagreement as to the merits of life in America and as to the value of our accomplishments in Southeast Asia. The point of view of one side has been pretty well ventilated with increasing drama over the years. It varies from the more sedate statements of *The New York Times* to the frantic remarks of people like Philip Berrigan, Jane Fonda, and Ralph Abernathy. In February of 1971, Tom Wicker stated that "there is something illogical, but most dishonorable in his (the President's) strategy." As late as December of 1972, Anthony Lewis stated, ". . . the elected leader of the greatest democracy acts like a maddened tyrant . . ." and in January, Mr. Lewis remarked that "even with sympathy for the men who fly American planes, and for their families, one has to recognize a greater courage of the North Vietnamese people. . . ." Joseph Kraft, in November 1972, stated, ". . . we have been shamed as a nation . . ." The May issue of *Newsweek* titled an article on our actions in Vietnam "The Spector of Defeat." In Congress, Congressman John G. Dow of New York spoke for the high-minded of his constituency when he announced: "the President is taking the risk of exterminating our civilization for a shabby purpose." And in the Senate, Senator George McGovern stated in June of 1972, "if we continue under the Nixon policy, we are not going to see our POWs again."

Those who disagree with this line do not often attract the attention of the above-quoted concerned citizens. Dissenters are rare, after all, and their point of view slips out only under the most unusual circumstances. In a recent instance, a group of fellows had to spend several years isolated in a foreign prison before they could stray from the sagacity of the media commentators. In fact, our POWs have managed to get into print certain sentiments which have not been seen in *The New York Times* since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor (perhaps one way of getting these sentiments aired is to allow the entire nation to undergo one sort of tragedy or another).

One week before the POW arrival, columnist Madam Van Horne urged that the American public, before deluging the POWs with the best fruits of our decade— bell-bottoms, black power slogans, and the like— pause and reflect upon whatever they have to say. Once the first POWs had disembarked, Van Horne listened to about three sentences before suggesting that the whole show was programmed, and so washed her hands of the affair. One can easily sympathize with her perplexity and the media's fuss. For the confused and astounded and frenetic, the following remarks of the returning POWs could have aroused no greater excitement had they been the voices of three-headed Martians:

Navy Captain Jeremiah Denton, as a spokesman for the first plane-load of POWs to touch down in the Philippines, said: "We are honored to have the opportunity to serve our country under difficult circumstances. We are profoundly grateful to our Commander-In-Chief and to our nation for this day." Then, choking up, he added, "God Bless America."

Air Force Colonel Robinson "Robbie" Risner, speaking for the second craft, said: "I would like to thank you all, the President and the American people, for bringing us home again. Thank you ever so much."

And as the formalities were dispensed with, Risner told an airport crowd, "I want to tell you something, folks. To us this is truly the land of milk and honey, the land of the free and the home of the brave."

Navy Captain James Mulligan Jr., for the third flight, said: "It has been our privilege to serve you Americans for these many years and during this time our faith in God, our country and in our families has never wavered. Today I'd like to thank the President of the United States, the people and our families for maintaining their faith in us and making this wonderful day possible." Then, looking down at the waiting crowd, he mused, "There's something great about kids waving American flags."

And then, as the men made their way from the plane to the buses, Air Force Captain Galand Kramer waved a sign he'd made while still in Hanoi which read: "GOD BLESS AMERICA AND NIXON" and one POW flashed a handtowel upon which he stitched an outline map of the U.S. and the words "GOD BLESS AMERICA."

Colonel Richard Byrne told a crowd that had braved the snowy Dayton, Ohio weather: "Somehow I feel a little out of place, for in a way I feel that we should be giving you applause. Because it is you who have kept the faith in us — faith with us through the long years. It is you who have stood by us and effected our release. I owe you a debt of gratitude. Thank you all and thank you to our President."

Captain Burton W. Campbell told his airport crowd: "I have been trying to figure out something to convey to you how I feel . . . the most appropriate thing I could say is thanks to President Nixon and most of all, thanks to you."

Air Force Colonel Ronald E. Byrne of New York City said: "To be back on American soil is a dream beyond our prayers. Thank you America for your unwavering support."

Navy Commander William Shankel said: "I want you to know we walked out of Hanoi winners and we're not coming home with our tails between our legs. We return with honor."

In a reflective mood, Navy Lieutenant Everett Alvarez Jr., the POW longest in captivity, said: "The U.S. is a great country. People don't realize what they have until they don't have it. We have many things to be thankful for, many things that are considered common. These are things I missed most."

As the tedious maneuvering of men through airports, hotels, and hospitals began to wind down, Alvarez said: "It has been a long time coming but we are going home — home to the greatest country in the whole wide world."

"For years and years," he continued, "we dreamed of this day and we kept faith — faith in our God, in our President and in our country. It was this faith that maintained our hope that someday our dreams would come true and today they have. We have come home."

Navy Commander Brian Woods, who along with Air Force Major Glendon Perkins, were the first POWs to be returned, said: "This homecoming is not only for myself and Glendon Perkins but for all the POWs. We are grateful and overwhelmed. We are proud to serve our country and our Commander-In-Chief."

Then Perkins said that to return to "the greatest country in the world" is the "most wonderful experience in my life."

When three POWs visited the elementary school on Clark Air Base to thank the children for posters and place mats they had made to welcome the returnees to the base, Denton, speaking for his two colleagues, told the children: "I know that John and Bill are as overwhelmed as I in being with Little America."

He then read a letter from Risner which stated: "We will always remember you, the smiling faces, the waving hands, the waving flags — and we love you."

Air Force Colonel Ronald E. Byrne Jr., who has been a POW since 1965, said: "Thank you, America, for caring."

Captain James Stockdale, limping visibly, quoted Greek poetry to express himself: "Nothing is so sweet as to return from sea and listen to the raindrops on the roof of home." He added: "We're home . . . America. America, God shed his grace on thee."

Navy Captain Wendell Rivers said: "I am very happy to come to my family, my friends, and my America."

Captain Mark Smith, who became known as the preacher of his camp, said: "I would just like to express to each and every one of you that it's wonderful to be back in the greatest country in the world, the greatest state in the world, and the greatest people in the world. God bless all of you and God bless America."

Navy Lieutenant Carl Galanti stated simply: "Freedom at last — that's what it's all about."

Yet no sooner had these men uttered their unfamiliar sentiments than the heralds of the New Age were again furiously pumping out sonorities from their inexhaustible resources of superior virtue. Jane Fonda, who had told us to expect a bunch of embittered peaceniks, had to revise her estimate and remind us that these men were more like murderers than heroes. The Blessed Father Berrigan forthrightly described them as "war criminals" and the ombudsman for *The Washington Post* tipped us all off to the fact that this POW episode was just another Pentagon Plot. Yes, America certainly has pulled itself together. All hail the New Age!

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Paul H. Weaver

The Public Discourse

Play Theory

What we say to one another is a serious business: ideas have consequences. A good idea can bring forth all sorts of blessings; a bad one can make life miserable. One man's confused brainstorm today, if unexposed and unchecked, will become everybody's grotesque reality tomorrow. Given the penalties that attach to this reasoning, one might expect that public discussion would resemble the wise, benign seminars of geniuses and angels. In fact, it is more often just the opposite, and experience teaches us that we must keep a vigilant and critical eye on the public discourse simply to avoid disasters.

Why is this so? Well, some parts of the answer are clear enough. People have a seemingly endless capacity to make honest mistakes. Bad ideas are harder to recognize than we might wish. Then, too, certain people acquire an interest in the perpetuation of bad ideas because they can make a living from them, and this accounts for much of the nonsense perpetrated by politicians, advertisers, and other such publicizing persons. Yet, more important than why nonsense exists is the question: why do we take it? And not merely take it, enjoy it? Our infirmities can account for a lot of what we do — but clearly not for all. People, after all, are not total dummies, and total dummies are what we would have to be to swallow the most flagrant nonsense of our editorialists, columnists, professors, and politicians. We need to find the missing link in our explanation.

Several years ago, a psychologist by the name of William Stephenson published a fascinating book called *The Play Theory of Mass Communication*. Its thesis was that people derive pleasure, not only from the *content* of communication, but also from the simple *act* of communication. We read, for instance, not only because we want to know what's going on, but also because we enjoy exercising the skills of reading. Thus, one reason we take and enjoy nonsense is that we often don't care whether what we are reading makes sense or not — so long as we are in fact reading it and enjoying the pleasures of reading *per se*. Indeed, we do not even care whether what we read has any content whatsoever.

Now I could go on at some length explaining Stephenson's subtle and elegant thesis—but I am not so sure that I am willing to count on your reading-pleasure alone to carry you through to the end of this column. So I propose to offer you instead an inspired piece of writing that is utterly without "content" and yet is still capable of arousing emotion and reader interest. The first time you read it, it will seem rather strange. The second time through, you will be amused. The third time you read it—and it bears even a third reading—you will see how acute Stephenson's theory is, and how completely one can become engrossed into a reading that says literally nothing. The article was written by Tom Johnson and was published in *The Village Voice* on June 1, 1972. Entitled "An Inside View of Bangkok," it is in its entirety that which follows:

I should admit at the outset that the title of this article is a lie. Not that it isn't a good idea. I suppose if I had been to Bangkok and felt that I had some kind of inside view, I might write an article on that subject. But since that is not the case, it would be presumptuous for me to do so. Perhaps it was wrong to select such a title in the first place. Yet an article does require a title, and it is impossible to devise a title for an article of this nature which will not be misleading in one way or another. You will understand what I mean if you continue reading for a while. Or perhaps you will not wish to read further now that you have been told that the article is not about Bangkok. But I am sure you have other interests aside from Bangkok. So perhaps you will continue reading, if only to find out what the article really is about.

Some readers will already have turned the pages to something else, but most will no doubt read on into this second paragraph despite the disconcerting nature of the first one. Some will be reading faster and more skeptically now than when they began. A few will be reading more slowly and with increased interest. Most will be proceeding on the assumption that the writer has simply chosen a very indirect way of introducing his subject, and that the article will soon begin to present concrete ideas of some sort or another. A few will already be suspicious that the article is going to continue in much the same way it began. Of course, the latter are correct. Though there are still many paragraphs remaining, they are all written in more or less similar style, and none of them deal with any subject in the usual sense. So readers who are only interested in reading *about* something would be well advised to turn to something else at this point. Those who continue reading should do so without any great anticipation of something to come. If they read expecting the article to make some point, they will only be disappointed when they discover that it does not lead up to anything in particular. But many articles which claim to be informing the reader are equally uninformative. And the idea that people read in order to gain information is largely an illusion anyway, since most of the time when people read they are not gaining information so much as simply exercising a skill they have learned.

While I am not concerned with informing or entertaining readers in the usual way, I do not wish to disappoint anyone. Thus I feel obliged to warn the reader not to anticipate anything. I realize it is difficult to read without anticipating, but readers who can manage to do so will find the article much more enjoyable than readers who can not. Meanwhile, I shall do my best to try to help everyone read the article with a minimum of boredom and disappointment. Perhaps the best advice I can provide at this point is that you skip the following paragraph, which is probably the least interesting one in the article. Of course, you may read it if you like, and I imagine most readers who have ventured this far into the article will not be able to overlook it completely.

If, despite advice to the contrary, you find yourself reading this paragraph, you should at least not read every word. If you do insist on reading every word, I can not accept any responsibility in the event that you become bored. And you probably will become bored by the redundancy and the lack of content. So please skim over the sentences so as not to waste any more time on them than necessary. If you are still reading every word, you will no doubt be quite disappointed by the time you conclude the paragraph and discover that it really does not say anything. You will become bored with the redundancy and the lack of content. If, despite advice to the contrary, you still find yourself reading this paragraph, you should at least try not to read every word. You will become bored by the redundancy and the lack of content. So please skim over the sentences so as not to waste any more time on them than necessary. If you do insist on reading every word, I can not accept any responsibility in the event that you become bored.

Even though this article does not pertain to Bangkok, it seems only right that I should refer again to "An Inside View of Bangkok," and thus make some attempt to relate article with title.

If the reader did not know quite what to think when I warned him initially not to anticipate anything from this article, he will now have a better understanding of what I meant. The article began with a discussion of its erroneous title, proceeded with a few remarks about how readers would react to the article and some warnings about what to expect. It then led into an unnecessary paragraph which the reader was asked to skim, followed by an unnecessary reference to the title and an unnecessary recapitulation of all these things. In all, it has been quite uninformative.

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

Charles S. Hyneman

State and Local Authority vs. Federal Domination

I believe that the question of where to put the power to govern this nation is of great importance and calls for a most serious re-examination right now. I have been asking questions about it, reading about it, and thinking about it for some time and I shall tell you as simply as I can what I think we are up against and what are some alternatives available to us.

But first, you should know something about the presumptions which guide my thought and the prejudices which may limit what I see and shape my conclusions.

One: I am 100 percent committed to popular self-government. I believe that elected officials ought to be firmly in charge of all important business of government in which there are significantly different judgments as to what ought to be the main lines of public policy. This does not mean that I think judges of the U.S. Supreme Court and superintendents of Army Hospitals ought to be elected, but it does mean that I think we now let administrative bureaucracies fix a lot of policies that ought to be debated and voted on in Congress.

Two: I am a strong believer in variety, in a diversity of policies and opportunities that provide for you to go your way and me to go my way. This means that I want to preserve the autonomy of businessmen and business firms and encourage free association in social organizations, and so insist that there must be mighty good reason for propelling government into some new area of American life. It means also that I think all government business that can be handled satisfactorily in the state house, city hall, or county courthouse ought to be put there and kept out of Washington.

Three: I think the national government now has more business than the elected officials (Congress and president) can adequately look into and look after, and I have no doubt that they will succumb to public demands that result in their taking on additional burdens. Unless the American mind takes a turn which I do not foresee, this assumption of new business will not be balanced by returning an equal amount of old business back to the private sector. Government in the United States is destined to reach further and further into our lives, unless I am a much worse prophet now than I have been in the past.

So we have come to the first question that I want to ask you and express a few opinions of my own about. What can we do to make sure that the persisting and enlarging volume of public business is attended to intelligently, with minimum costs and maximum gains to the American people? It seems to me that our present answer, a policy of continuously delegating power to national bureaucracies, is unacceptable. We have more administrative organizations now than Congress or the president can effectively oversee. Several of them are too big to be manageable even if Congress and the president did try to subject them to strict control. And finally, in my opinion, we are embracing a poor instrument for attaining the answerability to the people which the Founding Fathers had in mind — when we lodge a wide range of choices to fix public policy in officials whose names and reputations for prior achievements are unknown to the people they govern.

So I approach this question with two conclusions and a prophesy. A conclusion of principle — that elected officials ought to be firmly in charge of the government; a conclusion of fact — that the men and women we put in charge of the national government are not now maintaining that measure of direction and control; and a prediction — that this unacceptable condition is bound to get worse unless we reverse a long-developing trend.

What can be done, either to improve the ability of Congress and president to do well what they undertake, or to relieve them — more responsibly — of lesser business that hinders their addressing matters that ought to have first priority? Three possible alternative courses of action must be considered. Stated as questions they are: 1. Can we make the White House and Congress more efficient? 2. Can the congressmen allocate the public business among themselves in some way so that no congressman has to divide his attention among as many things as he does now? 3. Can we raise our state and local officials to a new level of importance by handing over to them sectors of public policy which up to now we have been entrusting to administrative departments of the national government?

I see little promise indeed in the first course of action — increased efficiency. As for greater efficiency in the White House, I think we can dismiss that from our minds altogether. The White House is one of our most revered national monuments. It must be visited by a few hundred thousand persons each year, and I suspect that a full third of the persons who go there are experts from the Bureau of the Budget who are trying to show the president how to use his staff more efficiently.

The Budget Bureau's experts stay away from Congress and no doubt a great deal more inefficiency abounds at that pole of the political planet. Congress took a magnificent step to improve the conduct of its affairs by restructuring committees and making better provision for research aids in 1946, and many congressmen think the time is ripe for another overhaul. But improvements of this order, desirable as they are, offer little promise, in my opinion, of freeing Congress for sufficient time to apply their wisdom to public policies. Far more would be gained if we could capture for more important uses the countless hours of time that congressmen give to constituents who insist on bringing little problems to the mightiest official to whom they have access. I am conservative in estimating promise of improvements in that sector, however, for I am one of those who believe that it is a good thing for a congressman to look a constituent in the face pretty often and be reminded that he was elected to serve

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the people and that he ought to know what the people are thinking.

The second suggested course of action, relocating within Congress the power to take final action, is one that I have not studied. The members of the lower house are relieved of a considerable amount of study and time in debate by not being required to approve treaties and advise and consent to the president's appointments. The Senate's time is conserved by the fact that it leaves most of the work on appropriation bills to the House of Representatives. It may be that there are other areas that can be turned over entirely to one or the other of the two legislative chambers without loss of wisdom or risk of injustice to any sector of the population.

There may also be some kinds of business that can be turned over entirely to a joint committee of one of the two houses, as I believe was the case with claims against the government at a time when it was thought that the claims ought to be adjudicated by elected officials rather than a court. If public policies of signal importance are to be decided finally within a committee, it will of course be necessary to make sure that the members of the committee are representative of the people whose interests are affected by the committee's decisions. The difficulties I see in identifying publics that need to be represented and apportioning committee memberships among the different publics strips me of any hope that much can be gained by this course of action.

So we are led up to the third course of action I mentioned: putting a larger share of governing in our state and local governments. I am convinced that we can do this with rewarding consequences if we make up our minds that we ought to and must. I am well aware that many people are fully convinced that this is not a feasible course of action. I am acquainted with the arguments they offer to support their point of view. I think they are influenced by two great errors in judgment. They put too high a value on equality of condition and uniformity in the application of public policy. And they have too low a regard for the ability of the American people to construct responsible governments, elect honest and intelligent officials, and put brakes on the excesses to which elected officials too often succumb.

It is a fact, and I attach great importance to it, that we are already engaged in a conscientious and persistent effort to improve our state and local governments. And with salutary if indeed not exemplary results in many places. Further, we have at hand a large body of thinking packaged and available for widespread distribution. Much of it comes to a head with precise proposals: formulae for replacing inefficient and haphazard government with efficient and responsible government, redrawing state boundaries, UNI-GOV for every metropolitan area, full-time state legislatures, and so on.

Personally, perhaps more as an incident of temperament that as a consequence of overpowering proof, I distruct formulas that are made to fit unexamined situations. The conditions that give a political jurisdiction its prominent characteristics and its most troublesome problems are various, not uniform and constant. The lesson I think I have learned is that every community presents its own set of problems, its own set of highly developed or underdeveloped resources of leadership and civic virtue, its own strengths upon which it can build and its own weaknesses against which it must guard. The needs of each place and the options available to it are not so peculiar, however, that nothing can

be learned from the experience of people in other places. I am a great believer in models as a stimulant to thought and a guide to learning. Surely one of the first things to do in preparing ourselves for more vigorous, more costly, more important government at state and local levels is to spread across the nation succinct but reliable accounts of successes and failures in governmental improvement containing lessons from which people in other places may profit.

Hand in hand with the contention that state and local governments are not fit for further governing responsibilities goes the assertion that they cannot meet the costs involved in a bigger scale of operations. We encounter some difficulties in fitting income to costs, but I think they have been exaggerated. Possibly it will cost the American people more, but I do not see why it should cost them much more to regulate themselves and provide needed services through state and local authority rather than through the great national bureaucracies we now employ. We must make certain that when governmental responsibilities are moved to another level, the money necessary for the operation is part of the transfer. Congress now delegates enormous areas of authority to the administrative departments and it annually appropriates billions of dollars to pay for their work. It can turn that same delegating and appropriating machinery in another direction. It can devolute governing authority to state and local governments as readily as it can delegate to administrative organizations, and it can allocate the money it controls to state and local governments as easily as it appropriates to the bureaucracies it nourishes in Washington.

But there is a hitch here — more than a hitch, a positive danger — and I hope not to underestimate it. Congress can hold the federal administrative department to some measure of accountability for its operations and its performance, and it does so in its annual budgetary review. I do not believe that Congress can hold the state governments accountable for the use of money with any comparable degree of success. The Washington administrative department is expected to have a rationalized program. Each sector of its operations seeks a high measure of uniformity in its impact on people wherever in the nation they happen to live. A veteran of the House Appropriations Committee learns enough about the program to ask sharp questions about the execution. But if we turn a billion dollar operation over to the state and local governments, the uniformity and the homogeneous character of the program ceases. The operation explodes. Diversity becomes the rule rather than the exception. Variation in styles of administration replaces the consistency in style which marked the administration when it was seated in Washington. This transformation from uniformity to diversity is inevitable because this is what we wanted to happen when we said: Get this business out of Washington and put it in the state house or city hall.

Some of Congress' concern to hold the spenders responsible for their use of money can be satisfied by setting up officials in Washington to maintain a watch, but that encourages a prospect that the small reviewing office will transform itself into a bureaucracy that insists on imposing uniformity on the local administrators just so that the bureaucrats can be sure they understand what is going on well enough to report it to Congress. Surely this is just what we are trying to get away from when we endorse devolution to the states and localities where the people live.

Shall we then instruct Congress to give the money to the states without strings attached, to give it without requiring those who spend the money to answer effectively for the way they use it? Or shall we require Congress to limit the amount it extracts from the taxpayers and tell the state and local governments to go directly to the taxpayers for the increased amounts they are bound to need. And if we do the latter, open up the personal if not the corporate income tax as a main source of state and local revenue, will the people back home impose any more or any less accountability upon the legislatures and city councils than they would impose upon Congress if Congress did all the taxing and made gifts to the states.

Judgments differ as to how we can best handle this problem of moving public revenues hand in glove with the transfer of government functions. Good minds are at work on the problem and I am impressed that we are advancing toward a full comprehension of what is involved in assuring that state and local officials will be provided with the money they actually need under conditions that require them to justify the things they do with what they get.

One further point must be made about the obstacles which must be surmounted in bringing about a dispersion of government to the state and local capitals. I speak of a state of mind that has taken

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hold of the American people with increasing intensity during recent years. Not just our talk but our behavior makes it clear that we have a compelling commitment to equality, and that leads to a fixation on uniformity in the impact of government on individuals. Determined that individuals living side by side as well as far apart who are caught up in competition for something of value shall enjoy equal protection of the law, we leap to the conclusion that Americans living anywhere within the national boundaries must be subjected to identical law. The only way to guarantee that one rule of law will extend over the whole nation is for Congress to enact the legislation, for a monolithic bureaucracy to enforce it, and for a national Supreme Court to review and revise the variant interpretations of each statute.

Local self-government was invented so that each community could have its own preferred services and its own preferred regulations. The glory of the American federal system has been its provision that the people of each state should live under their own code of laws. I recognize the necessity of calling national authority into action when any lesser political jurisdiction withholds elementary justice from any part of the population. If it becomes evident that the only way a black man can be assured of the right to vote in Mississippi is for federal agents to register voters and sit at the polls on election day — if that is the only way they can be assured the right to vote—then I agree that local registration and election officials will have to move over and let the federal officers take charge. The assurance of elementary justice is not what I am talking about when I say we have an over-developed attachment to uniformity in the application of law. I am not talking about the need for the federal government to come into a state or community to make sure that a minority group gets the fair deal in public services which is denied to them by state or local public authorities. I think that redress of local injustice by the national government is imperative.

What I have in mind when I warn against an exaggerated affection for uniform application of laws is a supposition that the surest way to prevent injustice is to have one government govern everybody. What I deplore is the supposition that national rules and regulations must cover, say, the growing of tobacco in order to escape the disadvantage someone might suffer if the rules governing measurement of tobacco fields in Kentucky differ a little bit from the rules governing measurement of tobacco fields across the state line in North Carolina.

The issue now before the Supreme Court relating to the financing of public education invites inspection in this connection. It seems to me to be a sound principle that some of the money stripped off of the wealthier communities of the state by taxation ought to be invested in the improvement of education in the poorer communities of the state. If this is a good rule for education, then it seems to me to be a good rule for health services, care for the aged and the crippled, and a good many other services we expect government to provide. If the judges conclude that the equalizing of services is mandated by the Constitution, inherent in the laws' equal protection requirement, how can the judges escape concluding that the quality of essential services in poverty-ridden West Virginia must be brought up to the level of the same public services in the far wealthier states of Ohio and Pennsylvania? If all the communities of the nation must be brought to the same quality of service, how would you guarantee that result except by a mass of ever-changing regulations of nationwide application enforced by a number of ever-enlarging federal bureaucracies? And if the great swarm of regulators bring all parts of the nation to the same level of public service, who will run ahead of the rest and set models for the less imaginative communities to imitate?

I do not predict that the Supreme Court will immediately project us upon this course of all plains and no mountains, all lock step and no pace setting. I do say that there is a mood hovering over the nation, a sentiment settling heavily upon great numbers of American people, which favors equality of condition and uniformity in the application of law. It is a mood and a sentiment which, if it persists and dominates our political philosophy, will negate any hope you or I may have of returning government of the American people back to the states and the communities where the people live. □

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Truman and the Maelstrom of History

At no time are complex historical events more neatly comprehensible than during a reign of ideology, and today in America, ideology is clearly in the ascendant. In some circles it goes under the rubric New Left; in other circles it is more ambiguously described as revisionist. Whatever it is called, it always manages to round the ragged edges off history's complicated events. That is precisely what it has attempted to do with the cold war. In its haste it has sheared off a great deal of the glory that a tough little man earned for himself and his naive countrymen right after the conclusion of the Second World War. I speak of Harry S. Truman, an authentic image of the American democratic ideal, an ideal still celebrated in the American heartland, and an ideal which holds that everyone counts — even a commoner from the remote state of Missouri. According to this ideal, any American citizen can become president, and working within the scheme of the American Constitution he should be able to do tolerably well.

As if to demonstrate the validity of his democratic ideal, fate kicked Mr. Truman into the presidency at one of the most inopportune times imaginable. The Second World War was drawing to a close, leaving half the civilized world heaped in a shambles. During the reign of Franklin Roosevelt, President for the past twelve years, America had undergone one of the most profound changes in domestic policy in its history. Mr. Roosevelt was a magisterial leader, considered to be one of the greatest in American history. He was idolized for his dramatic accomplishments, his break with the past, his powerful personality, and his fabulous entourage. When he died so suddenly and mysteriously on the afternoon of April 12, 1945, a shocked nation found it hard to envision the puny figure of Vice-President Harry S. Truman as inheriting Roosevelt's magnificent position. Had they realized the depth of Mr. Truman's condition, their fractured confidence would have been all the more shattered. Truman had hardly had a word with President Roosevelt in the few months he had been in the administration. He knew little about the intricate diplomacy Mr. Roosevelt had been weaving throughout the turbulent world. And he knew less of the military situation. When Truman was suddenly made President, he actually knew nothing of the revolutionary new bomb being hatched in the desert of New Mexico.

And his predicament was aggravated by the fact that most of Roosevelt's advisers had been positing their diplomacy with the Russians on notions that were utterly incompatible with Soviet designs. The Russians thought only of security. They desired to ring their vast nation with a *cordon sanitaire*, protecting them from any future foreign invasions, and Mr. Stalin intended that this *cordon* be as thick as possible. Meanwhile Roosevelt and his advisers implacably pursued a policy of unconditional surrender in the field and high-minded idealism at the diplomatic table. They dreamed of a postwar world characterized by self-determination under the irenic suzerainty of some sort of international government, welded together by international trade. It is hard to confect a dream more antithetical to the insular obsessions of the suspicious Russians. Yet these were the ideas of the leaderless administration when Truman became the thirty-third American president. And of course Roosevelt's misguided advisers now became Truman's advisers.

Outside the government American political discourse was not much better informed. America has always been a land visited by men of enthusiasms. The enthusiasms whistling through America at this time were not very intelligent or useful to a man in Truman's awesome position. Sober-minded leaders were

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making very few intelligent statements on foreign policy. Even General Eisenhower was given to vacant statements like "Nothing guides Russian policy so much as a desire for friendship with the United States." Imagine what less realistic persons were saying!

Though Americans in 1939 had indicated in opinion polls that if forced to choose between fascism and communism they would prefer the former, by 1942 they had reversed their positions, and influential elements of the American press were actually leading cheers for the Soviet way of life. *Life* magazine proclaimed Lenin "perhaps the greatest man of modern times," and jabbered on that "the Russians are one hell of a people...(who) to a remarkable degree ...look like Americans, dress like Americans and think like Americans." True, a section of the American people remained skeptical of communist Russia, and some had even tempered their expectations for the postwar period. But the more educated and influential Americans remained enthusiastic about Russia's willingness to promote the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. With such enthusiasms loose in the land, with imperious politicians and advisers of the Roosevelt administrations often contemptuous, Truman, the only American president in this century without a college education, tried to guide America through the last months of World War II and into the postwar era.

In July, 1945, he went to Potsdam and tried to fill FDR's position between the two remaining giants of the Grand Alliance, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. In the midst of the meeting the British snatched Churchill from his side and Truman was left with Attlee to confront the serpentine Soviet dictator. Their worlds were as wide apart as can be imagined. What democracy and freedom meant to Truman must have been incomprehensible to a tyrant like Stalin, so given to paranoia and treachery. We can only speculate about how many of their difficulties were born of guile and how many were born of the insurmountable misunderstandings of two men cultured in two diametrically opposed political philosophies. Just before the Potsdam meetings America perfected the atomic bomb, and Truman had to decide how to go about prudently informing Stalin of it and of its significance to the war. During all of this time Truman was trapped in the ambiguous grasp of past commitments and policies made by his predecessor. At this time FDR had been making vague commitments, and his policies may have been in a state of flux. At any rate his propensity for loose administration and procrastination would have left American foreign policy in somewhat of a mess even if his premises had been well-founded and congruent with Russian strategic interests, which they were not.

Steadily the war ended. After balancing the costs and benefits of using America's terrible new weapon, Truman chose to end the war quickly. Two bombs were dropped and the Japanese sued for peace. By now Truman was gaining a realistic perception of Russian intentions, but his realism was not shared by many of his fellow citizens. Before he could implement a policy of firmness for dealing with the rapacious communists, another old enthusiasm rushed through the American people — the enthusiasm for peacetime jubilation, then "normalcy." It was a re-enactment of the frivolous period following World War I. A chorus went up to "bring the boys home." Military appropriations were slashed, and Americans either showed no interest in their world responsibilities or maundered on delusively about the United Nations.

The precipitous American withdrawal and disarmament encouraged Soviet expansion. The Soviets had not been very cooperative at Yalta and were even less cooperative at Potsdam. As 1945 faded into 1946, they became obdurate. They would not sign treaties, repatriate prisoners of war, or show any interest in relieving the devastated areas of Europe. To the contrary, their interest was in reparations. Through it all Truman had to contend at home with the men of enthusiasms: enthusiasm for our noble Russian allies, who were not very genial anymore; enthusiasm for world trade, international organization, and self-determination for all nations. All were unrealistic notions. And then there was this new enthusiasm at home, an enthusiasm for ambrosia. It came at a time in which resolutions and farsightedness were necessary to assure world peace and a measure of freedom for war-torn Europe.

Churchill soon was describing Europe as "a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate." Many of the ravaged nations were without the essentials of life and were incapable of providing them. The situation was desperate. In Eastern Europe the democracies drifted imperceptibly into communist tyranny. First the ministry of the interior would come under Red domination. Then allegations of impropriety would be directed at the other branches of government. Then chaos, and finally Red dominance.

It was not until 1946 and 1947 that Americans became sufficiently aware of Russian truculence to support a sensible policy against it. During this time the average man from Independence, Missouri had his arms full trying to run the government. It is important to grasp the political and intellectual problems that hobble a politician during such times. Respect and prestige are essential if a man is to govern. After the glamorous Roosevelt it was very hard to respect a simple man like Truman. Many politicians sniffed at the thought that Truman would do more than fill out FDR's term. They began challenging him almost immediately. Many Roosevelt advisers suspected Truman's competence. Truman made some minor and expected errors, and his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, was callow and in other ways unacceptable.

Most Americans wanted to "get out of" Asia and Europe. Not many people knew what the Russians were up to and few appreciated the difficulty of ending a world war. It was a time of pother. Somehow Truman managed. He sweated away earnestly and energetically. He replaced Byrnes with a very sound Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, and he followed Marshall's counsel. As President he asserted himself as a confident leader determined to do his duty. He intended to be elected in 1948 and he manifested his seriousness by launching new policies that were singular and intelligent.

In reviewing his foreign policy achievement, one cannot help but note the mark of his strong character. His proposals were a dramatic departure from the past. He ended Japanese hostilities by ordering use of the atomic bomb. During his first administration a policy of prudent containment was outlined and given definition in the Truman Doctrine, which made it "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Enunciated on March 12, 1947, it directed economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, lest they fall into communist hands. It initially cost four hundred million dollars, and was a bold *demarche*.

Contributors

Philip C. Brooks has recently retired as the Director of the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, and as Secretary of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute...**David Brudnoy** is an associate professor of history at Merrimack College, national affairs commentator on WGBH-TV in Boston, and an associate of *The Alternative* .... **D.W. Cooper** is a graduate student at Harvard and the Editor of *Counterpoint* .... **Robert H. Ferrell** is a professor of American Diplomatic History at Indiana University. He is editor of the "American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy" series, and has written — among many books — *Peace in Their Time* (1952), *American Diplomacy and the Great Depression* (1957), and *American Diplomacy* (1959) .... **Joyce Goldberg** is a graduate student in history at Indiana University and **Assistant Managing** Editor of *The Alternative* .... **Charles S. Hyneman** is a Distinguished Service professor of government at Indiana University. He was President of the American Political Science Association in 1961-62, and he is the author of several books, including *The Supreme Court on Trial* (1963), and *Popular Government in America* (1968) .... **Roger Rosenblatt** is an assistant professor of English and the director of the Expository Writing Program at Harvard University; he is also the Literary Editor of *The Alternative* .... **C. Bascom Slemp** is the chief Washington correspondent of *The Alternative* .... **Paul H. Weaver** is an assistant professor of government at Harvard University and the Associate Editor of *The Public Interest*.

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Aid to Greece and Turkey was only a precursor to the Marshall Plan which funded the resurrection of modern Europe and cost $13,348,800,000. Truman was also responsible for the Point Four program, a kind of world-wide equivalent of the Marshall Plan. Under his leadership Germany was rescued from a "cigarette economy," and recovered rapidly. By reforming the German currency and seeking to revive the prostrate nation Truman triggered the most belligerent Russian threat yet, the Berlin Blockade. But if the Russians thought they could panic or daunt him, they had misperceived him, for with typical resolve he ordered the U.S. Air Force to transport supplies into the city, and he began marshalling what was to become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When two years later aggressive communism struck at the opposite corner of the world. Truman answered Russia's North Korean epigones with an American army and United Nations support. It is true that during this period the forces of freedom suffered setbacks in China, and the Russian presence in Eastern Europe was not dented. But no American president is given a magic wand, and even without considering his foreign policy failures, or his difficult domestic political circumstances, Truman's accomplishments in international affairs seem breath taking.

He was a truly unpretentious president. But what he lacked in formal intellectual training he more than made up for in character. His integrity was unshakable. He was brave, prudent, disciplined, and deliberate in making decisions. He had idealism enough, and his resources of common sense served him well — especially when so many of his advisers were panting through the White House full of the most foolish enthusiasms. So he had many of the attributes of a great leader as well as many of the endearing qualities of a first-rate character.

His weakness for partisanship was perhaps unavoidable, but it did flaw his service to his country. Perhaps the political problems of his presidency prevented the mastery of events that might have marked a less partisan administration. Constant and unrestrained political struggles within a democracy must have a corrosive effect on the social fabric. In dealing with them Truman showed little restraint or magnanimity. His *Memoirs* abound with spiteful references to opponents. And it does not strike me as a flight of fancy to draw a nexus from his kind of wanton partisanship to the politics being inflicted upon America today by the New Left. This is hardly to blame Truman for the vagaries of the New Left, but to suggest that politics must have some influence on civility. Truman's penchant for ripping and snorting might have been the only way he could summon Americans to his generally wise policies, but as with so many other things, it was not without cost.

History is not a very neat story. Those who attempt to plot it according to some preordained ideological theory write bad history. To make ideological claims about Truman's intentions is foolish. Truman was a very fine president whose achievement is all the greater because of the predicament from which he started. There are few presidents in this century who have matched his performance and none of his successors is comparable — though Mr. Nixon still might make the grade. Truman's policies saved much of the world from communist domination and left it with a bit more peace than might have been expected. At times during his presidency he was an appallingly unpopular man. Perhaps because of his unpretentious origins he did not worry much about popularity, but rather worried about performing his duty to his country and to his God, for he was a religious man. Before he died, he said something to his daughter that should renew our faith in that democratic ideal, for though it was right in an uncomplicated way, it also had a touch of the numinous to it. He said, "Do your duty and history will do you justice." Now it has. □

Robert H. Ferrell

Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View

In this issue appears the first part of a two-part article examing the Cold War revisionists and Truman foreign policy.

In the early 1960s a well-known student of American history, the late John L. Snell, published an article in the *American Hisorical Review* in which he dealt with several books on the origins of the cold war, and after criticizing two of them severely he issued a call for historians to turn their attention to that part of the recent past and write about it in the best traditions of their discipline! Little could he have imagined that in the next years some very able young historians just out of graduate school together with a young student of English literature, a disillusioned foreign service officer, a linguist, and a few other individuals would take the views which Snell and his contemporaries had advanced about American-Russian relations in 1945 and thereafter and stand them on their heads. Soon there would be a sizable literature on the origins of the cold war, it would find enthusiastic acceptance among college and university students throughout the country, and it would describe Snell and his aging colleagues as traditionalists, their historical opinions as received truths, and their conclusions as cold war rhetoric.

Consider the ideas about the origins of the cold war that were being proposed in the early 1970s — what a difference from the views of a decade before! So-called revisionist historians were writing that President Franklin D. Roosevelt's subtle treatment of the Soviet Union had been reversed by his successor Harry S. Truman who saw foreign affairs as a checker game instead of the chess game it really was. That the American government under Truman's direction had tried to oust the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, giving little or no attention to Russia's security needs in an area close to Soviet borders. That to get the attention of the Russians the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese. That they sought to keep Russian attention on the American atomic monopoly, and largely for such a purpose advanced a system of international control of atomic weapons, the Baruch Plan, which was almost bound to fail. Meanwhile the United States government used every economic weapon at hand, such as cutting off lend lease to the USSR, reneging on the reparations agreements concluded at the end of the war, and refusing to consider seriously the pressing Russian need for a postwar loan. Then early in 1946 the Americans seized upon an admitted Soviet slowness to get out of northern Iran and virtually forced the Russians out, in a public confrontation at the United Nations. The next year, 1947, marked a rapid development of American-Russian antagonism, for President Truman intervened in the Greek civil war with the Truman Doctrine, and in order to gain support scared hell out of the country, to use a phrase attributed to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. (Somewhat later, beginning in 1950, the administration would get what it deserved for this tactic, at the hands of a senator who took a free ride on the anti-communist bandwagon.) The Truman Doctrine inspired the administration to sponsor the Marshall Plan, a program worthy in itself but which had the unfortunate effect of dividing Europe; the President, the revisionists believe, probably had this divisive effect in mind from the outset, as in his memoirs he described the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan as being two halves of the same walnut. All the while, through a series of careful moves, the administration was creating a new state in Europe, West Germany, for the purpose of enlisting German industry and eventually a German army to protect the free world against world communism. By the early 1970s the revisionists had begun to turn to American postwar policies in the Far East, and were re-examining the origins of the Korean War; the outbreak of that conflict, they believed, was at least in part attributable to the policies of the United States.

I

The new historical views of the cold war were fascinating interpretations, and in seeking to understand how such a literature could arise the inquiring observer noticed, first of all, the relative

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youthfulness of the interpreters. The authors of the revisionist books and articles were young men who remembered little or nothing about the Second World War. Lloyd C. Gardner, presently professor of history and chairman of the department at Rutgers, had no thoughts about such a vocation in 1939 when he was five years old. Barton J. Bernstein was born in 1936. Gar Alperovitz in 1937, and David J. Horowitz in 1939. It would be possible to point out other ages, such as that of the later foreign service officer and journalist, and a markedly good one, Ronald Steel, born in 1934. It is true that the teacher of some of the leading revisionists, a charismatic figure who has inspired them to adopt his own "open door" approach to their historical judgments about the cold war, William A. Williams, was an adult in 1939, a first-year student at the United States Naval Academy. The point remains that most of the revisionists could not have remembered much if anything about the Second World War, the beginning of the cold war, and even about the Korean War. They came of age in the middle and late 1950s, and shortly thereafter found themselves in graduate school and then entering the teaching profession in colleges and universities in the early 1960s.

At the risk of seeming unduly analytical about a group of young men as fascinating as their interpretations — individuals who are good, sharp writers, who have a way of cutting quickly to their point or points, who must all of them be fine lecturers and impressive seminar teachers — one should venture to suggest another factor in their intellectual growth, namely, that they came into the teaching profession in a heady decade when the student population was doubling, faculties were doubling, grants were easy to come by, books easy to publish, when indeed anyone with brains and ambition could find himself with the title of doctor and professor in an almost miraculously short time, and with quite a decent salary too, and quick promotions and more salary.

And always there was that generation gap, the feeling that the older scholars — not so old, the oldsters themselves might have thought, but it made no difference what they thought — were if not over the hill then intellectually trapped in fantasies about the Second World War and what they believed had happened afterward. It was a case of men who could think of little except Hitler, Munich, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the long war, and especially the Russians' refusal of friendship after the fighting was over. This older generation had written the textbooks and the monographs and was in control of the departments and the deanships and it could not get Hitler out of its mind. The contemporaries of the Hitler-generation professors were running the federal government and dominating foreign policy, and as there were many stupid things about the conduct of universities in the 1960s so too the domestic and foreign policies of the United States government during the decade were having a few problems. The young men who came into the teaching profession in the early 1960s looked upon this scene with the impatience of all young men, an impatience in fair part generated by the fact of youth, their having been too young to have made many mistakes or to have known deep disappointment, the fact also that out of sheer luck they came to manhood at a time when the draft calls for the US army were

small and there was no large war in being or even a police action like Korea so that their careers were not blighted or interrupted by military service. Having come to their own stations of life without interruption they considered the preceding generation to be a kind of fountainhead of stupidity: "...our elders seem mired in the dead past: the Depression, the War, and the competition with Russia. The Second World War, which most of us are too young to remember except through the movies, was the last war that conceivably could be defined as just. What followed the defeat of Germany and Japan was a series of dynastic struggles between the new super-powers. Korea, like Vietnam, now seems like just another imperial war for spheres of influence, and the cold war itself little more than a power contest between rival empires, both prevented from launching a full-scale war from fear of suffering instant obliteration. Can there be anybody under forty who sincerely believes in the *morality* of American foreign policy, or that such a word is relevant to any nation's diplomacy?"[2]

One should perhaps explain at this point that the older generation has not found itself charmed by the cold war revisionists. The elders mired in the deep past sometimes recall wistfully a now little-known work by Dale Carnegie, who was not a relative of Andrew Carnegie, a volume which might help the revisionists if they could manage the time to read it.

But behind the hurt feelings, critics of the cold war revisionists constantly wonder why the new left writers (as some of them describe themselves) have become virtual slaves to one special interpretation of American foreign policy, the Williams interpretation about the open door. It may have been the generation gap, the fact that for the most part the older generation of the Second World War could not believe in absolutes. Whatever the reason, older historians have been almost incredulous in observing the easy way in which the revisionists picked up the favorite thesis of Williams and used it as a basis for their writings. One of their impulses for using the thesis was understandable. Walter La Feber and Lloyd Gardner had been trained at the University of Wisconsin and were Williams' students. But it did seem difficult to understand why at Wisconsin, where a half-century earlier Fredrick J. Turner had taught about the importance of the frontier before going to Harvard and making a name for himself with that interpretation, Williams was able to capture so much attention for another monocausal interpretation. The present writer remembers keenly the first time he heard this interpretation, from Williams himself in the mid-1950s, during a little seminar for historians conducted by George L. Anderson at the University of Kansas. Williams gave a paper showing how the open door policy was naught but a continuation of the old frontier thesis of Turner, and how hope for an open door for American commerce had dominated American foreign policy since the 1890s, if not before. At the end of the paper the present writer was chosen to respond first and could only remark his simpleminded incredulity at such an all-encompassing thesis — this after his generation had been brought up on a historical diet of the essays of Charles A. Beard and Carl L. Becker which taught that historical truths were relative.

Whatever one might think of the datedness of one-cause history, the revisionists almost without exception have espoused the open door theory of American foreign policy and in books and articles have pushed the theory for all the traffic will bear, and a good deal more. La Feber's doctoral thesis, entitel *The New Empire*, a survey of American foreign policy from 1860 until 1898, concluded that a search for raw materials and markets was the dominant force of the time.[3] Gardner's thesis, likewise published, likewise now available in a paperback edition, comes very close to saying that in the 1930s the effort to push a diplomacy of American commerce, the open door for American products, led to a clash with the Axis

1. "The Cold War: Four Contemporary Appraisals," **American Historical Review**, vol. 68 (1962-1963), 69-75.

2. Ronald Steel, **Imperialists and Other Heroes: A Chronicle of the American Empire** (New York, 1971), pp. 6-7.

3. **The New Empire**, winner of the Beveridge Prize of the American Historical Association, was published by Cornell University Press in 1963.

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powers and eventually war.[4] As Irwin Unger has said, how easier could the younger generation have hoped to tangle with the older, than to assert that the war against Hitler was only a war for American markets?[5] La Feber and Gardner passed from their doctoral thesis into analyses of the cold war, using the Williams principle. They not merely gathered around their arguments against American management of the cold war an old-fashioned aura of the open door (everyone knew, of course, that the open door proved a failure in China when tried at the turn of the century), but they pointed out how such a more recent piece of English composition as Henry Luce's "American Century" editorial in *Life* magazine in 1941 was only an assertion of the open door. According to La Feber, the post-1945 years saw an ironic and tragic clash between the United States' open door policy toward trade and politics in Eastern Europe (the American Century) and the USSR's desire for security around its borders. The young military historian Stephen E. Ambrose, who recently has slipped into cold war revisionism, can write agreeably that the policy of containment of Russia "was never more than a euphemism for the expansion of American influence and dominance."[6]

Perhaps the revisionists' fascination with the Williams theory of the open door, a belief that American commercial expansion was at the bottom of the cold war as of other discreditable episodes in American history, derives from the politics of several of the revisionists. Williams and Gardner are socialists, and so are Horowitz and Gabriel Kolko. The latter two revisionists subject their readers to heavy doses of socialism. Kolko is constantly talking about the necessary preconditions of this and that, which almost always are economic.

The fallaciousness of such an approach as the open door has often been pointed out, but the explanations evidently have not been convincing. The winner of the Pulitzer prize for history in 1972, Carl Degler, in a review of Williams' latest book has shown the improbability of an economic cause of the Spanish-American War of 1898, which Williams attributes in fair part to the desire of American farmers to expand their markets.[7] If the farmers wanted markets, Degler has countered, that might explain their support of the war, but how about the city folk who, if the farmers had been denied foreign markets, would have had cheaper food because of overproduction at home — what did they have to gain by supporting the farmers? Williams, Gardner, and other revisionists, good socialists, are bothered, indeed haunted, by capitalism, a kind of bogey. Are they not sophisticated enough students of American history to know that if there ever was a predatory, power-seeking era, an unabashed period when the capitalists prowled through the cottages of the proletariat like wolves, that time has long since passed? Jay Gould is dead (d. 1892). As for American goals in the Second World War, John L. Gaddis in a paper at the Boston meeting of the American Historical Association in 1970 has shown that economics cannot possibly explain the United States' motives in fighting the Axis powers: "Public and private statements made by policy-makers at the time . . . indicate that they did not accord the Open Door the importance revisionist historians have given it. President Roosevelt and his advisers did place great emphasis on reviving a multilateral system of world trade, but this was only one element of a larger scheme for avoiding future wars, influenced primarily by a determination to avoid the mistakes of World War I and the interwar period. Washington officials articulated with at least equal emphasis such other goals as unconditional surrender, the disarmament of defeated enemies, self-determination, and the establishment of a new collective security organization."[8] Carried to its logical conclusion, the revisionist economic interpretation indicates, of course, that the cold war was an irrepressible conflict, a clash for which individuals could bear no responsibility. But then the revisionists wobble on their one-cause interpretation and spend much analysis on how certain individuals, had they been listened to, could have changed history.[9] tory.

Might it not be that the concern of the revisionists with their open door theory shows that they are bothered by the enormous international, domestic, political, economic, and social transformations during the past decade and the decades prior to it, changes which many of the revisionists do not like, and for which they are seeking a satisfying explanation? In a recent article Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has pointed out how in the course of the changes of the past quarter-century the individual often has found himself in the hands of a kind of soulless, uncontrollable organization, and rather than seeking to control change so as to allow for the continuing movement of the individual will, many people are railing against change or attributing some single, simple cause to it when in fact it is a vast complex of ideas and interests all shaking against each other in almost cosmic proportions. "The basic task," as Schlesinger proposes it, is not to run off against some windmill but "to control and humanize the forces of change in order to prevent them from tearing our society apart."[10]

But all this discussion of what is at the center of revisionist thought about the cold war, or what might be at the center, is to say nothing about the scholarly techniques of revisionist writers — about which something needs to be remarked in general before turning to specific points of revision and how the revisionists seek to prove them. Here one comes to the issue, so much heard about in recent years, of a usable past. Let no reader hesitate to accuse the cold war revisionists of taking the present into the past. (One is somehow reminded of communist historiography where it is only the past that changes, never the present.) And in the course of observing their uses of the past it is not necessary to agree with Unger, who sees a good deal of historical revision as an effort to domesticate American radicalism, to conclude that cold war revisionists are not very tidy about their methods. Adam Ulam has written an injunction about historical scholarship that the revisionists would do well to take to heart; the historian, Ulam says, must accept the past as he finds it: "Before he becomes a philosopher of history or a judge, he must tell us what actually happened. His primary duty is not to be attuned to the currently fashionable trends in public thinking or to be a counselor to statesmen. It is to ascertain what, in terms of our knowledge, is a fact, what could be a reasonable hypothesis, and what must remain a conjecture. If he does not meet that test, he is a moralist or a publicist but not an historian."[11]

Cold war revisionism surely has fallen into several errors of historical method. For one thing, whatever their view of American responsibility for the cold war, the revisionists in their writings have adopted an unhistorical — and also unfair — tactic by virtually assuming that a statesman is wrong until proved right. Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence advises the opposite course. But most historians would assert that such a presumption about American national leaders has not squared with the record of, now, almost two hundred years. Should historians conclude that the era after 1945 was a sudden throwback not to American practice but to the statecraft of Renaissance Italy?

The revisionists also are expert at some of the old ploys of writers attempting to make points, as when they try to run in arguments on the unsuspecting reader. It is amusing to observe the virtuoso performances, up and down the

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4. **Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy** was published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1964.

5. "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," **American Historical Review**, vol. 72 (1966-1967), 1248.

6. Walter La Feber, ed., **Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: Documents and Problems** (New York, 1971), p. 3; Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Failure of a Policy Rooted in Fear," **Progressive**, Nov., 1970.

7. Review of **The Roots of the Modern American Empire** (New York, 1969), in **American Historical Review**, vol. 75 (1969-1970), 1780-1782.

8. "Domestic Influences on American Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1941-1947." I am much indebted to Gaddis for a copy of this perceptive paper.

9. Gaddis, "Domestic Influences"; see also a thoroughgoing analysis in Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," **Perspectives in American History**, vol. 4 (1970), 313-347.

10. "The Velocity of History," **Newsweek**, July 6, 1970.

11. "On Modern History: Re-reading the Cold War," **Interplay Magazine**, vol. 2 (Mar., 1968), 51-53, reprinted in part in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., **The Origins of the Cold War** (Lexington, Mass., 1970).

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literary keyboard, of Barton Bernstein, a most attractive young scholar with a Harvard Ph.D. and a ready grin who teaches at Stanford University, and who can write, presumably without the grin, that "A year before the global crusade of the Truman Doctrine ... " In similar manner he manages to bring into sudden focus the highly dubious point of Alperovitz and assert it as truth: "In 1945, when the United States sought to liberate Eastern Europe with 'atomic diplomacy,' Lippmann subtly warned..." And again: Lippmann "did not know that Secretary Byrnes had already tried to use atomic diplomacy to frighten the Soviets out of Eastern Europe."[12] Some years ago in a small meeting at the Truman Library, several scholars and the present author were treated to a bland assumption of the Alperovitz thesis by Bernstein, and when challenged on the subject his response was, with a grin: "I thought everyone agreed with Alperovitz." Similar pieces of oneupmanship appear in the writings of another attractive revisonist, one of the authors of the present volume, Gardner, who among other tricks can juxtapose two irrelevant facts: "Even before Bullitt's note arrived in the White House, the President had acted."[13]

Gardner's essay on William C. Bullitt in *Architects of Illusion* is a masterly example of how to influence readers — a combination of fact and surmise, a kind of glancing commentary about the era of Bullitt, assuming that the American ambassador to Russia and to France during the 1930s represented some large body of American opinion. In truth Bullitt was one of the oddest ducks ever to inhabit any duck run of foreign policy, a most quixotic individual who contrary to the innuendo in Gardner's essay had almost no influence on Roosevelt by the time FDR began to think about the country's entrance into war, not to mention later years when "Bill" Bullitt was painfully isolated from influence on anyone except possibly Henry Luce.[14] Perusing the Gardner essay on Bullitt the aging traditionalist historian has a kind of scholarly dream that he, the reader, is looking down from a spotter plane on a triple-canopied jungle, under which Lloyd Gardner is operating as a Vietcong, and that Gardner darts out to make a tendentious point, only to become a black-pajama blur as he bolts for cover before the historian-reader can aim a smoke rocket and call in the fighter-bombers.

John Gimbel, the author of a much-cited study of the American occupation of Germany, has complained at length about "the kind of *hocus-pocus* that is often passed off as historical research by those who write cold-war history," and this sorcery is sometimes observable in the summoning of nonexperts to give

expert — that is, convenient — explanations.[15] La Feber's revisionist *America, Russia, and the Cold War* makes much of a letter from Alfred P. Sloan to Bernard Baruch written in 1945 that La Feber found in the Baruch papers at Princeton.[16] Yet Sloan's view of what should be postwar policy toward Germany (he wanted the American government to revive German industry, contrary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper numbered 1067 which was supposed to guide American military governors) was Sloan's view, and whether it figured in the calculus of the American government must at the least be suspect. The letter does play into the beliefs of many present-day students who are sure that General Motors is up to monkeybusiness.

David Donald in what for the most part is an attack on cold war revisionism has praised the books of Kolko and La Feber, saying that these revisionist authors and not the older scholars of the establishment "have written the basic books, resting upon massive research, on the last three decades of our foreign relations."[17] Donald is an expert on the American Civil War and on Reconstruction, the Pulitzer prize biographer of Charles Sumner, but he is dead wrong about cold war revisionism, for he obviously has not checked out the revisionists' footnotes. Much of their footnoting is as phony as Charles C. Tansill's documentation of twenty years ago about Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor.[18] As Tansill was accustomed to document the irrelevant and the well-known, so Kolko and La Feber can produce an array of footnotes that look like the real thing. But underneath those awesome citations can be a remarkable thinness. How otherwise explain the constant appearance of citations to the unpublished Baruch papers at Princeton in La Feber's text on the origins of the cold war — when most writers about the post-1945 period, and surely a majority of the individuals alive today who took part in the politics of the era, know that Baruch was a vain, pompous, egotistical self-advertiser ("that old goat," Truman once remarked to Clark Clifford), who by his own recounting had made a fortune in the stock market and whose opinions were highly unrepresentative but who occasionally had to be brought in on American political issues, partly because of the sheer publicity he generated, partly because his conservative politics tended to scare away Republican and crackpot critics.[19] La Feber knows this, but the Baruch papers happened to be open and they were full of opinions, a convenient quarry from which

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12. "Walter Lippmann and the Early Cold War," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., **Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years** (Chicago, 1971), pp. 32, 46, 36.

13. **Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949** (Chicago, 1970), p. 6.

14. Beatrice Farnsworth, **William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union** (Bloomington, Ind., 1967).

15. John Gimbel, **The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949** (Stanford, Calif., 1968). The quotation appears in "Cold War: German Front," **The Maryland Historian**, II (1971), 41-55.

16. **America, Russia, and the Cold War** (New York, 1967; 2nd ed., 1972), p. 20. La Feber's documentary volume, ***Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947***, prints the Sloan letter (pp. 129-131) as Document 34; Document 33 is the Potsdam agreement on Germany, and Number 35 is Secretary of State James F. Brynes' Stuttgart speech of Sept. 6, 1946.

17. "Radical Historians on the Move," **New York Times Book Review**, July 19, 1970.

18. The revisionists have had a field day with their scholarship, so-called, because historians have failed to look at their footnotes, other than to be impressed with the variety and thickness. At last a historian has gone behind those notes, back to the sources, checking out the contexts of quotations, especially watching for the revisionists' use of ellipsis points. It turns out that their footnotes are a mosaic of misrepresentation. See Robert J. Maddox, "Cold War Revisionism: Abusing History," **Freedom at Issue**, Sept.-Oct., 1972, pp. 3-6, 16-19. This article is introduced by Oscar Handlin, the distinguished Harvard historian, who has been in the fore of the disbelievers in revisionism. Maddox has a book forthcoming at Princeton University Press. As for Tansill, the present writer was once shown confidentially a most painstaking analysis of the footnotes to Tansill's **Back Door to War** (Chicago, 1952), the volume which he and his supporters claimed was based on the Department of State archives. It certainly was whenever Tansill was proving a commonplace. When he came to crucial points his State Department documentation thinned down to nothing. But he discovered the unpublished Department records helpful in other ways; his many impressive citations to newspapers indicated that he used the Department's press surveys without attribution, an odd procedure for a scholar who maintained that one could not trust the Department of State in any manner, shape, or form.

19. Baruch had threatened to get off the reservation during debate over the Truman Doctrine, largely because the President had the temerity to recommend Greek-Turkish aid to the country without consulting Baruch. The President's advisers had a time bringing Baruch around. Truman flatly refused to court the old man. The President's counsel, Clark Clifford, told Lilienthal, who put the remark in his diary (entry of Mar. 23, 1947, **The Journals of David E. Lilienthal**, II (New York, 1964), 163-164), that the President said: "I'm just **not** going to do it. I'm not going to spend hours and hours on that old goat, come what may. If you take his advice, then you have him on your hands for hours and hours, and it is **his** policy. I'm not going to do it." The President said there was a decision to make and it was going to be made. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal gave a dinner for Baruch, and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman were there; beforehand Forrestal called up Lewis Strauss, who attended, and said the purpose of the meeting was "to grease the old boy." About this time Lilienthal was moving carefully with Baruch for another reason, and noted that "They really work at it, too. Everyone does. Everyone, apparently, but the President, who says he just won't." For another piece of Baruchiana see my **George C. Marshall** (New York, 1966), p. 223.

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to take commentaries, such as the letter from Sloan about free enterprise in Germany. Responsible historians, one might conclude, should not use the memorabilia of old goats. Much of the other documentation by revisionists cycles around the commentaries of critics of policy such as Walter Lippmann, Henry A. Wallace, Claude Pepper, Glen Taylor, or James A. Warburg, who always were operating on the outside of affairs, whose opinions were so flighty that no sensible statesman could have welcomed them into the inner councils of power.[20]

To add another detail to the above points about documentation, one should not fail to notice how the revisionists love to cite the works of each other. Alperovitz in a footnote for his paperback of collected essays recommends La Feber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War* as "the best brief one-volume survey of the postwar period," which can be "usefully supplemented" by Richard J. Barnet's *Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World*. Both, he relates, "are excellent, especially for college teaching." (This is a thoughtful recommendation in view of the fact that Alperovitz has never taught in college.) Gardner's *Architects of Illusion* found his good friend La Feber's *Russia, America, and the Cold War* an "excellent survey," and remarked his "indebtedness to Professor La Feber." La Feber's subsequently published *Origins of the Cold War*, a book of documents and pseudo documents (he includes the Sloan letter), credits Gardner's *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* as "the best synthesis of the entire 1933-1945 period," and relates that *Architects of Illusion* "is the best work covering the entire 1940s."[21]

In regard to documentation, John Gaddis in the preface to his new and very able nonrevisionist study, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947*, relates that historians of the era after 1945 must constantly remember that they are dealing almost entirely with American materials. Scholars, he says, "face a peculiar problem" in that "we have little reliable information about what went on inside the Kremlin during the same period."[22] Unless they can get access to the Russian side they surely must write with something less than dogmatism.

Speaking of the American side it is a fact not well understood even within the historical profession, not to mention the public at large, that cold war revisionists and other scholars interested in foreign policy after the Second World War have used US government archival materials to a very slight extent, because almost all of those materials have been closed until recently. At the present writing (1972), State Department archives have just become available for events through the year 1946. Access to the archives of the Department of State is tied to publication of annual volumes in the documentary series *Foreign Relations of the United States*; the series is now dealing with 1947, and it can be assumed that the records for 1947 will be opened in the near future. The eminent diplomatic historian Dexter Perkins, eighty-three years old, a past president of the American Historical Association, author of twenty-three books, most of them about American foreign policy, in a recent communication to the *Newsletter* of the American Historical Association has cautioned his young colleagues, the revisionists, in a pointed manner. "There are . . . reasons," he writes, "for great modesty in dogmatizing about the history of American foreign policy in the last quarter century. The documentation is incomplete..."[23] How can David Donald say that some of the revisionists have produced the basic books, resting upon massive research, when for the most part they have not even had the benefit of published volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series, not to mention the mountain of documentation that lies behind *Foreign Relations*?[24]

The size of the American unpublished records leads to a final observation about the methods of the cold war revisionists, although this observation is only indirectly related to the State Department files in Washington. It concerns generally the morass of material, unpublished and published, that a researcher finds available. The heterogeneous, huge body of documentation makes a cold war historian, revisionist or traditionalist, long for the task of the scholar of the Middle Ages who in confronting a problem of documentation may have to deal with three documents, two of which are fakes (the task being to discover the original). Any researcher on the cold war, getting into a huge body of material even without using the American archives, looking for some meaning amidst the near-chaos, must quickly fix upon two or three or four principles and from them try to derive some overriding theme or thesis by which, at least in his own mind, he can order the material. Otherwise he could spend a lifetime behind the paper barricades. But the revisionist perhaps will refuse to change his thesis when contrary evidence appears. If he feels strongly that Vietnam was not merely a great error but only the most recent collapse in a row of dominos, he will tend to feel that, to use Kolko's Marxist phrase, the necessary preconditions are there and hence the thesis cannot be wrong, despite the evidence. At such a point the trap of the present will close not with a bang but ever so softly, over the would-be student of the past.

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In analyzing the revisionist view of the cold war in some detail it is necessary to say at the outset that there is no accepted body of revisionist doctrine, that the loose aggregation of young scholars, a few older scholars, and some journalists who have received the name of revisionists are not agreed even upon the name, which to some of them is a foolish term. There are very considerable disagreements in regard to the origins of the cold war; no simple listing of revisionist views can do justice to individual, dissenting members of the group. Even so, there are generally held theories and hypotheses.

For the first year of the cold war, 1945, the revisionists have advanced three contentions, the initial one of which is that President Roosevelt was a subtle, sophisticated operator in foreign relations as in domestic politics, and that President Truman was pretty much the opposite, and hence for personal reasons alone, the change in the presidency, American foreign relations took a downward plunge once the feisty, hardhitting Missouri politician became President. Gardner is not, apparently, too sure of this argument, although it is perhaps in another particular that he has spoken of a devil theory of history. Kolko cavalierly has brushed this personal argument aside and accused some of the revisionists of being enamored with personalities in history, instead of forces, the latter of which according to Kolko are the determinants in the inexorable movement of capitalism toward its Waterloo. Whatever the dissenting opinions there does seem to be a belief on the part of most revisionists that Truman stiffened up American diplomacy to such an extent that he may have reversed it. Athan G. Theoharis, who is concerned about the effect of foreign policy in bringing on the McCarthyist excesses, is convinced that Truman's new outlook was of major importance.[25] Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson in one of their explanations of their rambunctious article on "red fascism" published in the *American Historical Review* assert that Truman "was clearly more blustering, less cautious, and less willing to compromise."[26] This view, one might add, echoes the contemporary opinion of many New Deal Democrats who for a while after the war found themselves moving toward support of Henry Wal-

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20. The revisionist, Paterson, in his edited volume, **Cold War Critics**, has brought together essays on the above individuals together with chapters on Robert A. Taft, black critics of colonialism and the cold war, I. F. Stone and the Korean War, and the threat to civil liberties.

21. Gar Alperovitz, **Cold War Essays** (Garden City, N. Y., 1970), p. 92n; Barnet's book was published by the New American Library and World Publishing Company, New York and Cleveland, 1968. See also **Architects**, p. 354; **Orgins of the Cold War**, p. 171.

22. **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947** (New York, 1972). I am again indebted to Gaddis, and to his publisher, Columbia University Press, for allowing me to read his book in galleys.

23. AHA **Newsletter**, May, 1971.

24. A conference of researchers and archivists sponsored by the General Services Administration and held at the National Archives in the summer of 1969 introduced many scholars to the complexities of the national records, and further details have appeared in successive issues of **Prologue**, the new Archives journal ably edited by Herman Viola.

25. **The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945-1955** (Columbia, Mo., 1970); **Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism** (Chicago, 1971).

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lace; at the outset of the Truman presidency these liberals believed that the country's leader from Missouri was junking FDR's foreign policies just as he was abandoning the Roosevelt heritage in domestic politics.[27] The usual demonstration of Truman's tough attitude toward the Russians is to point to his treatment of Molotov when the Soviet foreign minister passed through Washington in April, 1945, en route to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations.[28]

It is an interesting speculation to think of one leader reversing the policy of his predecessor, and Schlesinger has pointed out the dramatic temptation here, and yet this theory about a change in policies has less to it than meets the eye.[29] Roosevelt was a compromiser, sometimes to the point of dissimulation. At other times he could be so devious, or unable to communicate his purposes, as in his withdrawal of support of James F. Byrnes for the vice-presidential nomination at the Chicago convention in 1944, that to the present day one is uncertain what he originally had in mind, if he had anything in mind. An individual with this makeup could drive his straightforward subordinates to distraction, or fury. General George C. Marshall never really trusted Roosevelt, and the only time Marshall went to Hyde Park to see the President, despite many invitations, was on the occasion of Roosevelt's funeral. As compared to Roosevelt, Truman was an enormous breath of fresh air, so open and businesslike. All these points have been made many times and are well known. But to push them into a conclusion that Truman, whose *modus operandi* was so different, sought to reverse Roosevelt's foreign policy is to make an historical mistake.

Truman in 1941 had delivered himself of a snap judgment that Soviet publicists, and the revisionists, would never forget, for shortly after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union he had said he was delighted and hoped they would fight each other to the death, with the United States helping whichever side was losing; but this opinion had given way to more maturity of thought long before 1945 and the presidency, and there is every reason to believe that despite the little talk session with Molotov the President loyally undertook to carry out the foreign policy of his predecessor. For one thing, he was too new at the job to have many detailed opinions on foreign policy. For another, he was properly sensitive to the fact that he had been elected Vice-President only because he was on the ticket with Roosevelt, and it would have been presumptuous of him in April, 1945, to have started off on his own presidential policies, foreign or domestic. For a third, his actions in the spring of 1945 showed that he wanted to get along with Stalin. Churchill was after the new president, for the old Britisher as well as many of the members of Roosevelt's disgruntled official family eagerly anticipated a more straightforward presidency. As is well known, the Prime Minister wanted a showdown with the Russians. To Churchill's intense chagrin Truman refused to allow American troops to remain in the parts of the Soviet-designated zone of Germany into which they had entered in the last days of the war against Hitler.[30]

The revisionists like to show that at the outset of his presidency Truman was listening to some hard-line advisors (to use a later expression). Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was upset because of the anti-Russian feeling among Truman's advisors, notably Averell Harriman and the latter's Moscow assistant in charge of Russian lend lease, Major General John R. Deane. But Herbert Feis' last book, *From Trust to Terror*, points out that at this time Harriman was not on the inside of Truman's group of advisors, nor for that matter was Stimson. The new President had turned for advice to FDR's chief of staff, now his own, Admiral William D. Leahy.[31] At the outset Truman's opinions on foreign policy seem to have been so uncertain that at the same time he sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to assure Stalin of the new administration's desire to cooperate with the Soviets to achieve European peace he enlisted Joseph E. Davies to go on a mission to see Churchill in England. Davies, to be sure, was a well-known "softie" on communism, who must have made a simply awful impression on Churchill, who when ambassador to Russia prior to the Second World War had justified the purge trials and in his book, *Mission to Moscow*, described how Stalin was no tyrant, that a child would sit on the dictator's lap and a dog would sidle up to him.

In trying to show that Truman took a hard line after Roosevelt's more subtle approach, the revisionists in one respect have struck some fire, at least some good quotations. In addition to relying for diplomatic advice from Admiral Leahy, Truman turned to Byrnes, and almost immediately designated the South Carolinian to be Secretary of State, after the end of the San Francisco Conference when it would be possible to get the hopelessly naive Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., out of the secretaryship. The arrange-

(continued on page 28)

(The conclusion of this article will appear in next month's issue. The essay itself will appear in The Truman Period as a Research Field *edited by Richard S. Kirkendall. U. of Missouri Press.)*

26. For the article see **AHR**, vol. 75 (1969-70), 1046-1064. It produced an utterly unprecedented flow of letters to the editor, to which the authors responded with as much heat and sarcasm as the critics bestowed. See **AHR**, vol. 75, 2155-2164; vol. 76 (1970-1971), 575-580, 856-858. It all reminded the present writer of the nineteenth-century railleries from and to Thomas Carlyle in which critics did not fail to mention Carlyle's wife Jane, one of them remarking that Thomas and Jane deserved each other.

27. Alonzo Hamby, "The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth," **Journal of American History**, vol. 56 (1969-1970), 863.

28. "He had never been spoken to like that before, exclaimed Molotov. But knowing who his boss was, one must assume that the Soviet statesman was exaggerating." Adam B. Ulam, **The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II** (New York, 1971), p. 64.

29. "Origins of the Cold War," **Foreign Affairs**, vol. 46 (1967-1968), 22-52. This article, which still seems to the present writer an admirable piece in every way, stirred the revisionists to fury. From the heartfelt nature of the wrath one had the feeling that Schlesinger had skewered several of their favorite illusions, to use Gardner's word.

30. On this point, which surely needs a book, see William M. Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," **World Politics**, vol 16 (1963-1964), 1-31; David Herschler, "The Grand Alliance and Germany – 1945: the Decision to Withdraw the Anglo-American Forces from the Soviet Zone of Occupation," M.A. thesis at Brooklyn College, 1972, done under the direction of Hans L. Trefousse.

31. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1970), pp. 17-19.

Philip C. Brooks

A President in Retirement — and History

Harry S. Truman's physical vigor and his habit of regular exercise helped him to survive many years in retirement. He saw not only countless changes in political and social America, but also the completion of a library focused on the years of his career, which became the center of his attention. Only two presidents lived to greater ages than he, and only six for longer periods after leaving the White House.

Mr. Truman's retirement was divided into three parts: the first, from January 1953 to July 1957, was spent in getting reacquainted with private life (never as private as the Trumans would have liked), in travel, and in a busy political life. He spent most of his time in the handsome Victorian house in Independence which has been the Truman home for more than thirty years, and in an office in Kansas City only ten miles away. In the second period, from July 1957 to June 1966, he spent six-and-a-half days a week in his office at the Truman Library close to his home in Independence, reading, writing, keeping up a massive correspondence, continuing his political interest, and seeing innumerable visitors—leading figures of public life, groups of all kinds, personal friends, and strangers who were often surprised to be able to talk with him. The third period,

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during which he was ill from time to time, was spent at home, reading, taking his daily walks for most of these years, and still seeing many visitors.

Mr. Truman spent nine years at the Library, longer than he was in the White House by nearly two years. He enjoyed what Mr. Roosevelt had hoped for: an institution built to house the papers and other historical materials of himself and his contemporaries, which would become an important research center. He once wrote that if the "Library had been conceived as a memorial to me personally, I would have done everything I could to prevent its establishment during my lifetime...I encouraged the building of the Library only because it was to be a center for the study of all the Presidents and the Presidency as well as the history of the United States." (Harry S. Truman, *Mr. Citizen*, New York, 1953, Bernard Geis Associates, 239 p.)

Once the institution was established, however, he showed the same ability to depend on specialists for operations that had marked his terms as president; "the Library belongs to the Government," he told the Director, "and it's all up to you to run it." He did not seek to influence the priority of persons whose papers would be sought, nor the equality of access by all scholars to the Library's holdings.

His interest in the Library continued to demonstrate his lifelong historical bent. His early extensive reading of history—especially biographies of the presidents — has often been noted. He was, in a sense, a history buff — not an academic historian in any sense (the academicians with their esoteric language sometimes amused him). But he put his knowledge of history to serious purpose, adducing historical analogies countless times in connection with his own actions. He was still invoking a regard for history in what was probably his favorite retirement activity (aside from politics), talking to groups of young people. "Study your history," he would advise them, saying that they should learn how the greatest government in the history of the world got to be that way. And he would admonish them that it was the responsibility of their generation to keep it that way.

Mr. Truman in retirement showed none of the pomposity often associated with "elder statesmen." But he was consulted by innumerable politicians, and every succeeding president came to see him at some time. He played active roles roles in the campaigns of 1952 and 1956. In his knowledgeable comments and his judgment in handling people he showed some of the characteristics that had proved valuable to him as president. He is often thought to have been unprepared for that position, but events proved that he was unprepared only insofar as his current knowledge of Roosevelt's actions was concerned. Judgments made of him often suffer from misunderstanding of a peculiarity of Missouri law in which county administrative officials were known as "judges." Thus, uninformed people often supposed that he had been some kind of justice of the peace instead of the chief administrative official of a county of four hundred thousand people.

His experience in World War I combat, on the farm, and in the rough-and-tumble of local politics contributed to another misunderstanding that was partly of his own making. His candor and his close affinity with the "man on the street," plus a good deal of humor, often caused him to speak in a way that many people thought too casual, but which belied both his rather conservative personal character and his great respect for the presidency. His quick comments "from the hip" were usually grounded in deep-set beliefs and principles, and his decisions on firm convictions about what he felt was the right thing to do. Those who knew him well always speak of his thoughtfulness, his graciousness, and his devotion to friends and family—qualities that went far to explain the loyalty that he inspired among his associates.

Among the viewpoints that Mr. Truman enjoyed belittling, in retirement as before, was that strange myopia that causes some people to regard any Middlewesterner—who has not disavowed it—as *ipso facto* "average" (used as a term of opprobrium) and dull. He had himself shown qualities of leadership as early as World War I that made him other than average. What was important was that he knew and understood the people that were "average" (in the best sense) and communicated with them. Although the policies which gained him broad support as president largely concerned foreign affairs, his own program dwelt heavily on the needs of the common man.

Mr. Truman was conscious that he would have a place in history himself, and to some extent he probably regarded the Library as representative of posterity. Like many other former presidents he wrote memoirs explaining and justifying his actions, and later quite a different kind of book about his first few years years in retirement. (Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, New York, 2 vol., 1955, 1956, Doubleday & Co.; *Mr. Citizen, op. cit.*) Mr. Truman knew that the "revisionists" would come, from both the Right and the Left, as they do after every historical period. And they worried him little when they did come, even though some of them had worked at the Truman Library. Nor was he concerned about the perennial and ever-changing game of "rating the presidents." He was pleased but not boastful when his attention was called to an article that rated him seventh among all the presidents in general prestige, and sixth in "accomplishments of their administrations." (Gary M. Maranell, "The Evaluation of Presidents: an Extension of the Schlesinger Polls," *Journal of American History*, 17:104-113, June 1970.) He was not heard to mention it again. That article was based on a poll of more than five hundred historians, as against the seventy-five of the poll by Professor Arthur Schlesinger in 1962, which had placed him ninth in greatness. (Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Our Presidents: a Rating by Seventy-Five Historians," *New York Times Magazine*, July 29, 1962.) After 1948 he had reason to be skeptical of polls, and he always said we wouldn't know anyway for fifty years whether or not a man had been a good president. □

Roger Rosenblatt

The Great American Column

Movies About Schools

Every time a college or high school is to be depicted in the movies, we know precisely what the settings will look like: a bird's eye view of a great lawned quadrangle, shot at a couple of hundred feet, descending carefully towards ivy-covered neo-Georgian buildings, finally settling at ground level to catch students in clusters, all walking at the same ceremonial pace, elaborately toting different sized books, and chattering furiously. In the case of high schools, the ivy is removed, the students walk faster, and the noise is at a higher pitch. When such pictures snapped on the screen twenty years ago, they were accompanied by a massive male chorus humming "Gaudeamus Igitur," or, as in the radio program, "Halls of Ivy," an anagram of it. Now, as in *The Graduate*, we usually get the picture songless to suggest stark modernity, but the conception of a world apart remains unchanged.

The figures who populate these settings are also foreknown to us. One grandly befuddled teacher, lost in and to his subject of study, unable comically *(The Bells of St. Trinians)* or pathetically *(Who's Afraid of Virginia Wolff?)* to make connections with his students or outside realities. One dean, president, or headmaster, equally out of things, either because he stands for order in a madhouse *(Horse Feathers)*, or because he functions as a businessman in the world of ideas. One football coach, ordinarily Jim Backus, obsessed, gruff, loud but lovable, another blunderer. Trustees, blunderers all, too crass to understand what education is all about. And students, individually or in groups, also blunderers, but only insofar as they are

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located in school. Once out and on their own, one trusts for them a healthier life.

Whether or not this picture is unfair is not important. Actually it is less unfair than oversimplified, the greenery and bafflement which characterize movies about schools being largely true to the models. The question is, what feelings in us do these predictable depictions create or sustain? Assuming that every pop cultural convention supports a genuine cultural idea, what is it in the genre that we find pleasant or reassuring?

The action of these movies is almost always guided by the opposition of teacher and student, who are placed in an adversary relationship at the outset, and proceed throughout the plot to delineate themselves in terms of their frictions, eased or increased, with each other. The teacher does not really exist without the student who, depending on the movie, is either the object of his professional function, the source of his rejuvenated aspirations, the redemption of his own biography, the apple of his eye, the thorn in his side, or the eternalizer of his boredom. The student similarly doesn't exist without the teacher, who serves either as the authority in the way, the pathfinder out of the slums, the target for a fistfull of chalk, the rival, lover, muse, or sometimes, death. The student will outlive the teacher, and this fact is central to their relationship. One character is locked into his role seemingly forever. The other merely uses part of his life, the youngest and least experienced part, involved with the first.

As a dramatic situation, leaving realities aside for a moment, all of this makes for an interesting conclusion on the part of the observer. No matter what the particulars of the adversary relationship are, the audience must suppose that the teacher, be he majestically complicated, introspective, generous, even heroic, is, because of the nature of his work, moving in circles; whereas the student, be he inarticulate, insensitive, a lout or buffoon, is, because of his vertical climb, his graduation, going places. The attendant supposition is that to stay in school is to go no place, and that having been to school is having been no place, that is, no place real. Movies about the subject consequently take on an aura of fantasy. Whether we view the academy in *Brother Rat* or *The Group*, we are to associate what we see with the unreal life.

The unreal life, put baldly, is that which is not encumbered by the need for cash. It is the life of June Allison and Peter Lawford vaulting staircases while leading a Hollywood glee club in "Varsity Drag," the life of Ali McGraw playing the violin, or whatever the hell she played, the life of Tom Courtney running his lungs dry, and the life of Lawrence Olivier feeding poetry to a teeny bopper, but it is not the real life, the life of the pocket. The unreal life is that which is not "useful." It may be cheerful or perplexing, but it is not of this world, not of our sense of it, anyway.

Realizing our sense, movie-makers, and tv series makers too, often make adjustments in their school characters which will supposedly allay public prejudice. Teachers are made to achieve heroic stature in various situations, not by force of their learning or devotion to it, but by other statements of force, such as earning black belts in karate, or having their war records displayed (usually by a wound revealed), or by galloping over the female staff like the world's last Renaissance lover. Glenn Ford survived *The Blackboard Jungle* because he was able to punch out the hoods, and when things got too tight for television's Mr. Novak, he could always toss some student-gangster through a transom. In such ways do our movie teachers compensate for their intelligence, a compensation deemed necessary both by our association of education with uselessness and unmanliness as well.

This latter association is most blatant in westerns where the beige sterility of the schoolhouse (and schoolmarm) is always played against the glitter of life in the local saloon; but it is also part of a more general conception. Our classic American leader and model is not the teacher-educated, but the self-educated man. Having pulled himself up by his own bootstraps, his manhood has virtually been defined by his self-education, which in turn implies that his manhood would have been threatened or weakened by schooling, and syllogistically, that schooling is an unmanly influence. (One glance at Ichabod Crane standing up against Brom Bones in "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow" says it all.) Given this conception, our movie schoolteachers always choose to prove their value in brutal terms, a decision which only deepens antagonistic suspicions, and thereby pleases everybody.

Useless, unmanly, even anarchic. I doubt if there has ever been a movie about the academy where someone hasn't complained in exasperation about the "fancy notions" some child has picked up in school. The fancy notions are usually the progressive or liberal ones, the ones which, depending on whether they're addressed to Ray Milland or Walter Brennan, either urge a new way to treat people or bridle mules. The fancy notions may eventually win out in the plot (usually some compromise measure is hit upon wherein all Ancients and Moderns are reconciled), but they are always judged basically dangerous because they are bred out of intellection, rather than intuition or convention. As for the paradox that education can be regarded both useless and dangerous at the same time, it is resolved in our general hatred for things invisible, the things schools deal with.

If hatred really is at the center of our feelings about schools, we show it in an interesting way. Instead of supporting a cultural representation which seriously criticizes or openly scorns formal education, we support one which makes fun of it. Teachers in movies are always funny, clownishly, as in *The Absent-Minded Professor*, grotesquely as in *The Blue Angel*. They are laughable in western culture generally, but particularly in America where the standard national virtues are antithetical to an educator's attitudes or conduct. Where clothes make the man, it is funny not to care what you look like. Where a sense of direction is admired, it is funny to appear in a daze. Where activity is essential, it is funny to be contemplative. Where absolutism means power, it is funny to think relatively.

Yet the long cultural laugh is not simply at teachers, but at the whole shebang, the process of formal education which is slow and deliberate, and the institution itself which is isolated and stratified, an institution which is, in point of fact, structurally and constitutionally undramatic and anti-Romantic. If schools were only undramatic, we wouldn't mind so much—our focusing on fraternity rites and love affairs would simply be an expression of theatrical preference. But it is the anti-Romantic factor which goes most roughly against our grain, against the kind of intuitive right thinking we like to think we possess. We cannot abide in formal education what we cannot yet accept for ourselves: impracticality, the rejection of force, informed innovation, orderly criticism, and most of all, the rational activity which may show that we're available to failure. What we cannot abide, we set in stereotype.

David Brudnoy

The Living Legacy of Frank S. Meyer

He's been dead a year now, the man William F. Buckley, Jr. once called the "principal living American theorist of freedom." He was that, and a man who wrestled with his conscience for decades, who only at the very last came to the Church, though some years before, having abandoned Communism and braved it through his long night of wandering, he had come to God.

I

The following remarks concern Frank Meyer the teacher: what he taught, what he meant (and means) both for conservatism and for general political-philosophical thought in America. A few sentences from Garry Wills' remarks about Frank Meyer in a special section about him in *National Review* (April 28, 1972) serve us well here, limning the man many of his friends knew so well:

"Though Frank wrote widely, he made his real impact as a person, remote yet gregarious, irascible yet affectionate, opinionated yet infinitely likeable. He always wanted people around him, wine and talk flowing, incessant sharp arg-

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uments that never captured friendship . . . .(H)e was younger than students, staying up later, drinking more, shouting louder, giving 'lively debate' (that polite dead term) its rare real sense — debate that does not kill and divide, but unites even in difference, and throws off sparks of light instead of conflagration. He had a whole constellation of the disappearing virtues—those of friendly hard argument, odd tolerant prejudice, and the nonharmful egotism that excites others not merely oneself, a genuine 'ambition' for the careers of all kinds of people."

His 'ambition' for people was, first, foremost, that they *think*. There was in him a fierce disdain for those who simply emoted, simply *felt*. "Damn it to Hell, that man is always *feeling* this and *feeling* that! Doesn't anybody ever *think* anymore?" He was not the classic True Believer, not by a long shot. But a man who totally accepted Marxism, and worked actively on Communism's behalf for years, then realized its wickedness and left it totally, and went on at last to an enlightened conservatism — such a man would and did retain the characteristic of wholehearted commitment. As a teacher — and this in the nonformal sense—he held no academic post ever, though his "credentials" were fine: Princeton, Oxford, London School of Economics, Chicago — his inspiration was always: think, reason it out, comprehend it, and believe what you say. The flaccid mind, the mind that dealt in pat phrases and the neatest of categories, all nicely packaged — that mind could receive little from Frank Meyer, and Frank cared little and offered less to such minds. He even used to wince at mention of the category into which others tried to stuff *him*: fusionism.

American Conservative Union Chairman M. Stanton Evans hit the target: Frank Meyer was the "most versatile intelligence yet to emerge from the American conservative movement." When he tried to wed libertarianism, the residue of nineteenth century liberal laissez-faire, with Burkean traditionalism (that's "fusionism"), he realized that although the two needed each other, and, indeed, in America were inextricably intertwined, they would not always live happily-ever-after together. (Traditionalist conservatives may charm with their reactionary romanticism, and orthodox libertarians do jolt us with their dogmatism. But alone, untouched by the softening graces of traditional conservatism, libertarianism ultimately repels any but ideologues; and alone, unchallenged by libertarianism's irritating radical a priorism, traditionalist conservatism ultimately bores any but the hermetically sealed. The two ingredients in the conservative goo require the leavening of each other; yet they have never entirely jelled into a smooth pudding, not even in the hands of Frank Meyer, who stirred the mix longest, and best.)

When the uninformed talk of "conservatism," they tend to list it along with liberalism, radicalism, Communism, Fascism, and other isms, as if it too were an ideology. Peter Witonski observed that Frank Meyer "recognized that American conservatism was not ideological in character, and it is this discovery of his that caused so much trouble among the ideologized intellectuals of our day. . .It is far easier to come to grips with the well-defined categories of an ideological system, such as Marxism, than with a fluctuating, variable tradition like conservatism." Thus, to some of the over-ideologized, Frank stood for nothing that *they* could appreciate, nothing rigid enough to save them the trouble of on-going re-evaluation, of — thought. He walked not on a thin tightrope between the "left" abyss of unblinking libertarianism and the "right" abyss of complacent tradition-

alism; but rather, and here the metaphors end, he jogged along a ragged path winding through both gardens, plucking something of enduring value here, something of worth there. He knew no reason why anyone with eyes to see could not discern that American conservatism *was* both its traditional evolution and its enduring emphasis on liberty. Since by definition a tradition *evolves*, it can never be complete, at an end, enshrined once for all. And since, in fact, liberty is no solitary thing, definable in brief, its attainment at any given time depends specifically upon those circumstances in which a society finds itself, owing to the tradition's unfolding.

His bent of mind was dialectical. For Frank, it was thesis pricked by antithesis, rarely synthesis arrived at permanently. When he was in the mood simply to pontificate, to lay down absolutes, he came on like a rigidifier, like one who thought he had The Answer. But at his best (fortunately far more frequently than the other), he was childlike in his searching, his wonderment at the magic of discovery; at his best he was also academic in the finest sense, in his insistence on working things out properly, not just expeditiously. Those who sit in or have sat in classrooms watching instructors who have divested themselves of all obligation to seek Truth and *then* declare it, or, alternatively, watching instructors make fools of themselves by their sanguine assumption day in day out of the mantle of Wisdom, have need of the likes of Frank Meyer.

But Meyer-like teachers are rare. Education suffers; too many teachers are buffoons, too many students are dunderheads, and between the ludicrousness of the professoriate and the slothfulness of the young scrufflies (as Meyer like to call them), what passes for learning in many of America's classrooms approaches low parody more often than high enlightenment. To sit and drink and argue with Frank was real education, and he offered it to philosophical friends and foes alike. Now that's no longer possible, and only his memory remains for the few, and his writings for the many. Mr. Witonski writes: "Socrates said that virtue can be taught, but, he added, there are no teachers of virtue. In Frank Meyer, the conservative movement found a teacher of virtue." In Frank Meyer, moreover, thinking people today of whatever political or ideological stripe can find a challenge.

II

"While truth and virtue are metaphysical and moral ends," Frank Meyer wrote in *Modern Age* (Fall, 1960), "the freedom to seek them is the political condition of those ends — and a social structure which keeps power divided is the indispensable means to this political end." That was his reading of the Founding Fathers. An essential ingredient in conservative thought, American and European, is respect for a just government, one that, whether divided in powers as in the United States, or unified in sovereignty as in various Old World lands, can seek truth and uphold virtue. Baldly stated, it has an old-fashioned ring to it, one mightily unconducive to the "modern" mind. Especially in the unswervingly libertarian disposition, this fundamental emphasis on government seems almost embarrassing; it is so, so later-day *liberal*, after all. And yet, without engaging in the mental gymnastics by which some tell us that American conservatives and liberals are practically identical, we *can* say that an important aspect of both American liberalism and American conservatism has been and will continue to be emphasis on good, puissant government. Frank recognized this, and though railing continually against the gargantuan, abysmal growth of meddlesome government in America, nonetheless did not abandon his belief in the wisdom of the *Federalist Papers'* authors, that which he abbreviated in the sentence beginning this paragraph.

He always recognized the difficulty of his position: "What I have been saying can be criticized as eclecticism and attacked as an effort to smother principle." But, from the same *Modern Age* piece: "Our task is to overcome the nineteenth century bifurcation of the western tradition in fruitful dialogue, not to perpetuate it by refusing to understand the breadth and complexity of our heritage, out of a narrow historicism that unearths outworn party emblems." He believed, and this was his oft-repeated sentiment that gave rise to the concept of "fusion," that in America a "harmonious unity of the tensed poles of western thought was achieved in political theory and practice, as never before or since." In other words, he traced the struggle to harmonize tradition and liberty back to the founding experience. For Frank, it was nothing new; his task was the ongoing one of political resolution.

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Frank took John Stuart Mill seriously, and more, he took him as a spiritual ancestor, not uncritically, to be sure. He found Mill unclear, and not absolute *enough* in the grounds of his defense of liberty. "I assert," Frank wrote, "the right of individual freedom not on the grounds of utility but on the grounds of the very nature of man and the nature of the drama of his existence. He lives between good and evil, beauty and ugliness, truth and error, and he fulfills his destiny in the choices he makes. No social institution, not even the conglomerate of such institutions we call for convenience 'society' can make the least one of these choices. . . .Only the individual person, whose fate it is to choose, can be free, for freedom is no more nor less than the possibility— and responsibility — to choose. *Freedom is the essence of the being of man,* and since all social institutions are subordinate to men, the virtue of political and social institutions should be judged by the degree to which they expand or contract the area of freedom." *(National Review,* March 28, 1956, emphasis added) Frank saw liberty as the political end of man's existence, because liberty is the condition of man's being. "It is for this reason that conservatism, which in preserving the tradition preserves this truth, is only constant to itself when it is libertarian."

To which some would reply: sophistic. Or worse: an unholy matrimony . . . an inconsistency . . . a contradiction in terms. Those who know of Frank Meyer and have debated his merits, have heard that sort of response to his thought. To which we might rejoin: is not the recrudescence of an authoritarian status society or, alternatively, the frenzied glorification of political and economic ultra-individualism — are not either of these, snares and delusions? Imbued with Frank Myer's thought, his intellectual heirs find either of the extremes repugnant; and more, they find them incomprehensible. Carefully, minutely, cautiously, Frank worked through the logical propensities of both ultras; he could discern *hope* only in the amalgam of the best of both, and *honesty* especially in denigration of the worst of either. "Truth withers when freedom dies, however righteous the authority that kills it, and free individualism uninformed by moral value rots at its core and soon surrenders to tyranny." *(National Review,* June 6, 1956) "The love of liberty and the love of truth are not the hostile standards of irreconcilable parties; rather they form together the twin sign of any viable conservatism." And we might add: they are the twin sign of any viable philosophy applicable in the United States of America as we know it, or should hope to know it.

One reads through collections of his articles (especially *The Conservative Mainstream,* 1969), and finds year after year the unchanging principle, albeit with different emphases. The American conservative "cannot posit freedom as an absolute end nor can he, considering the condition of man, deny the role of the state as an institution necessary to protect the freedoms of individual persons from molestation, whether through domestic or foreign force. He is not, in a word, a utopian." *(National Review,* January 16, 1962) And the same year, his *In Defense of Freedom* elaborated that view. Only extended quotation, not possible in this article, can put Frank's case fully, though a summary from that January 1962 article offers enough for our purpose here. 1) There is great danger to human freedom, and thereby to the achievement of virtue, if any more power than that which is absolutely necessary is lodged in the same set of hands. 2) The state *is* a necessity as an institution to preserve the freedom of man from infringement by other men through domestic or foreign force or fraud; and to settle the disputes that occur when rights clash with rights. 3) From this necessity are derived the legitimate powers of the the state: defense, the preservation of domestic order, the administration of justice. 4) The exercise, however, of these necessary functions requires a dangerous concentration of power — the monopoly of legally and socially accepted force. Any additional control over individual persons in any sphere of their lives adds dangerously to this already dangerous concentration of power. 5) No other activities of men, except these three legitimate functions of the state, require the monopoly of force. All others can be performed by individual persons and voluntary associations of persons. 6) Since the power of the state is dangerous to begin with, and since all other functions beyond its essential three can be performed by men otherwise, the preservation of a truly free political order demands the limitation of the state to these functions. To summarize: "Conservatism unites the 'traditionalist' emphasis upon virtue and 'libertarian' emphasis upon freedom. The denial of the claims of virtue leads not to conservatism, but to spiritual aridity and social anarchy; the denial of the claims of freedom leads not to conservatism, but to authoritarianism and theocracy."

Some will retort that it is all too simple, too pat. And had Frank left it with generalities, with broad-stroke philosophizing, the charge would be fair, almost. But precisely because he knew that those simple sentences contained outlines, not detailed formulations, he went on for nearly two decades in *National Review* and in other journals, exploring the world and pronouncing upon the state of its health. Like a Confucian scholar determined to "rectify names" (call things properly, accurately), Frank Meyer inveighed against the cheapening of the language

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by the obliteration of all sense. For example, years ago he noted with restrained irony the ludicrousness of calling Supreme Court Justices Douglas, Black, and Warren "libertarian" when in fact the "intensity and breadth of their devotion to the liberty of the person" is (was) low, except in certain very special question." *National Review*. October 12, 1957).

Frank did not and would not approve the inane notion that government should enforce The Good. "The calamitous socialization which has descended upon these United States in the years since 1932 is grounded in the very situation against which the framers of our Constitution sought to guard: the use of government to impose upon men positive rules of action." Nor would he give more than the back of his hand to the argument that government would be doing right if only the liberal government were not *misunderstanding* The Good. He brushed that nonsense off, that if once they but rightly knew The Good, then the governors would be correct in enforcing it, with reference to Aristotle: "In order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i.e., one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves."

The limited government established by the Founders of this country aimed at restraining the *imposition* of "virtue," while simultaneously enhancing its prospects of attainment. Government limited to the preservation of order and the administration of justice, Frank wrote, is that in which virtue is best exercised in a social situation; government must have as its essential aim the guarantee of the maximum of possible freedom to each individual person. The balanced society is our heritage, Frank wrote (*National Review*, January 16, 1960). "It is the answer to the false antithesis pressed upon us by liberalism. It is a society neither 'open' nor 'closed,' (but) a society open to the truth and freedom, closed to positivist nihilism and statist tyranny."

From those observations, all else followed. Frank knew the meaning of tyranny; he devoted fourteen years of his life to advancing Communism's cause and then realized what he had done and what that cause meant. Contrary to those who flatulently assert that because Frank had been a zealous Communist, then apostized, he had become a zealous anti-Communist and nothing more; contrary to that view, the bulk of his writings shows beyond doubt that his anti-Communism was but one part of his whole war against oppression. He knew what "idealism" means when the ideals are wrong. He knew what "devotion to cause" means when the cause is wicked. He knew what zealotry, of whatever brand, means: absolute subservience to Dogma. All this such idealism, such causes, such zealotry he repudiated. And never did he give in to any such again, from his renunciation of Communism in the mid-1940s onward.

He stood always with men of principle (not fanatics), rather than with "pragmatic" men. He warned his fellow Republicans against Richard Nixon, and they came to see what he meant. He championed Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Ronald Reagan in 1968: had he lived through to the election of 1972, he *might* have voted for the President, because of the alternative, or *not* have voted, because of what this President became, but he would not have deluded himself or allowed anyone in earshot to be so deluded into thinking that the "choice" was other than painful. Frank was a Republican nationally and a Conservative in New York State, but above all, politically, he was a conservative, as grimly conscious of the woeful state of the nation under Dwight the Good as he was enraged by the even more doleful

condition of things under Richard the Expedient.

Democratic or Republican administration, 1950s "complacency" or 1960s revolutionism or 1970s moral and intellectual bankruptcy: whatever the occasion, or time, or party or president, or for that matter, situation, however significant or infinitesimal, Frank Meyer approached the matter from the perspective of the libertarian-conservative, a term as unwieldy as "fusionist" is mechanistic, but about the best we can do by way of a descriptive catchphrase for him. Would his *National Review* column, "Principles and Heresies," ever run out of steam? Some asked him that, incredibly enough. Never, until death took him from it. His principles were sound and unchanging, and of heresies (or delusions, or idiocies, or evils, or whatever one would substitute for "heresies") we have not yet gotten our fill.

III

This essay has set out not to trace Frank Meyer's thought in a hundred areas; for that, those of his books already mentioned, and *The Moulding of Communists*, are the best sources. I have set out simply to tell what it is that Frank Meyer believed and then, now, to suggest why this piece is titled the "living legacy" of Frank Meyer. Like any other thinker, he was at times wrong in particulars, but never in principles. As to the latter: we have, as empirical evidence, only to look around us, to listen carefully to the babblings of the dogmatic libertarians hot to sell the lighthouses and charge users for mini-patches of city greenery and make garbage collection voluntary and the fire department a money-making proposition, and to the quaint but frightening preachments of the ultra-traditionalists who would rest happier if an American Franco could come to power or the Twentieth Century disappear; we have only to attend to those forced alternatives to know that something between both *must be* our destiny. And beyond the practical considerations (and the admittedly caricatured alternatives), we have the shining lessons of our own history to attend to: as Frank said for years, we have had a history evolving a tradition of liberty. We must keep it, extend it, grow wiser by learning from it.

If the principle be plain — the right kind of order and the right kind of freedom, a limited government and a maximized sphere of individual liberty — the practice is hard. Like all mortals, Frank Meyer was not perfect, nor were his articles always wise or his voiced opinions always judicious. One would serve Frank ill were one simply to eulogize him. As the years wear on, the danger is ever-present that the glow of recollection will pretty Frank up, will wear off the rough edges that were very much part of him, will reduce him simply to the Godfather Fusionist, thereby trivializing him by an excess of sentimental (and unthinking) hagiolatry.

He was more, certainly, than just a philosopher, though he was that above all. He spoke to *issues* as well. His pulse was quick and often sure, and frequently when he swooped down on a "heresy" his aim was perfect, so accurately did he sense the meaning of an event or a movement or a tendency in political or social life. Sometimes his judgements were harsh. He called the counterculture an "anticulture." Rock music: an abomination, non-music, junk, he said. If one chided him for not listening to enough rock music to know, he would respond: "I don't *have* to listen to 'enough' of it, damn it; I *know* what it is and I've just told you!" Would the counterculture survive and deepen and spread itself broadly across the land? Frank said it was a barbarism that would either take over and destroy civilization or, more likely, a barbarism — but always a barbarism — that would repel the people, who would in due course expunge it, or one which its practitioners (devotees? cultists? congregants?) would themselves abandon. On this, perhaps, he was more right than wrong, if unflinchingly acidic. And if so, he was right because his understanding of fundamental matters was sounder than most people's; he knew better than many of his fellows what in general was permanent, and what ephemeral, in America.

An area of continuing importance, in which Frank's ideas deserve especially careful attention (and qualification) is that of race relations. Like any truly civilized man, he was repelled by the late sixties and early seventies extremism of the Negro "*revolution*." He called Martin Luther King's game before many caught on to it (see his essays in *National Review*, June 18, 1963; April 20, 1965; October 4, 1966; January 16, 1968), and he understood exactly the way in which "Liberalism run riot" (*National Review, March 26, 1968*) perverted the just cause of civil rights until what emerged was that squalid farce, "black power." But like many others, he never sufficiently overcame his loathing for the perversion to return to a wholly judicious view of the plight of Negroes in white America. The insight was there, and the principles, but (and perhaps this is owing in some measure to his weakened physical condition in the last year and a half of his

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life), Frank's final public view is not entirely adequate as a guide to understanding this matter.

But as to that issue, and others, this is not the place to argue his perceptions with him. Yet if we are to derive anything of continuing value out of Frank Meyer's thought other than the crucial central perception, we must learn to apply his mode of analysis to contemporary problems, not humbly and meekly to accept his every opinion as Writ. There is nothing startling about this notion, nor anything specifically limited to Frank's legacy as opposed to that of any other significant thinker.

But two tendencies are already at work now, just one year after his death of cancer at age sixty-two, in April 1972. The one goes like this: Well, Frank Meyer wasn't really up on everything, and so, though he was a fine man and all that, he just isn't relevant to us now. That's the creeping mindlessness one hears echoed by so many, especially younger people, who are off hunting another adoration-worthy guru (having foolishly adopted that least guruesque gentleman, Frank S. Meyer, as their guru in the first place). The other sentiment, voiced by fewer people, of course, because fewer bothered to invest the time and energy in contemplating his thoughts in the first place, content merely to know that he was a Great Person, is this: Frank Meyer was the greatest mind conservatism in America has produced, and he was always correct, so we had best take to heart everything he ever said, and believe it. M. Stanton Evans, a first-rate conservative mind himself, said of Frank that "his libertarian conservative writings (will rank) among the principal achievements, not only of modern conservatism, but of political thought in general." Which is true, and a far cry from the parodied, jejune Meyerphilia mentioned just above.

We must always be on guard against the damage that retrospectives can do to the thoughts of seminal minds. It is as easy to bury Frank's thoughts by lavishly adoring them *in toto* as by dismissing them as "irrelevant" to the seventies and beyond. His legacy is his cardinal insight, and his mode of analyzing events in light of that crucial tension which he perceived in fundamental American political and philosophic thought; his legacy is *not* the every particular in his corpus of writings. Whatever one's political or ideological or philosophical "thing," there is enormous worth in Frank Meyer's contribution to the world of ideas, available for the taking. He was a splendid teacher, not just because of what he taught, but because of his attitude toward learning. We learn from Frank whenever we contemplate the problems he considered — if we are cognizant of his central beliefs in those matters, are willing to make some of the efforts he made to grapple with them, and are determined to allow him to live in us not as captain but as coach. □



The Washington Scene

(WASHINGTON)—For the sagacious pundit and judicious observer of the Washington scene, 1973 already heralds the truth of that widely sung chorus line—Only in America.

Only in America could a court declare jurisdiction over the ethical question of abortion and get away with it. And only in America could a presidential candidate win with the landslide proportions of Richard Nixon, without enabling his party to capture a majority in either the House or the Senate of the United States Congress.

Through the peculiarities of the American political process, the demarcation for the battle between the Republican President and the Democrat-controlled Congress has been drawn. Although the President's political insensitivity to those hallowed halls of wisdom, marble, virtue, and hot air would make executive-legislative relations trying under even the best of circumstances, this particular political breakdown does little to help the problem.

The words constitutional crisis" are already synonymous with the ninety-third Congress and rumor here in Washington has it that Ted Kennedy's government in exile stands ready and waiting to offer its leadership to save the country. Although the Nixon Court has also shown indications that it has its own ideas on what it will take to save the country.

Journalists and academicians have long speculated over what a second Nixon term would entail. Various writers had seen signs which indicated that the President was a Tory Socialist at heart, while others had assured us that, in truth, Mr. Nixon was a Hobbesian liberal. Neither image was particularly reassuring for the American liberal, and neither image was very pleasing to the American conservative. It is, however, unlikely that these next four years will produce any definitive interpretation of the Nixon philosophy. Instead, it seems more likely that the President will attempt to meet the challenges of his time to secure the base for that so very elusive "emerging political majority."

The first signs of how Nixon envisions his next four years came when the Administration introduced its Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1974. Ever since the New Deal, and particularly with the Great Society programs, the prevalent philosophy had been (in the words of John Kenneth Galbraith) that "all federal spending was automatically good," irrespective of any other considerations. That completely misunderstood Washington commentator, Nicholas von Hoffman, also expressed the character of Great Society philosophy in his tribute to former President Johnson: "You (Johnson) were so impulsive. You tried to solve social problems like a drunken hardware wholesaler trying to snag girls in a Paris nightclub. You drank so much of the social betterment bubbly the nation woke up with a hangover. Every right-living nation ought to go on that kind of drunk every so often, and even if you went about it the wrong way, you got us thinking about what we should be doing." But this "spend-now-pay-later" philosophy has resulted in an almost uncontrollable federal budget, with mounting deficits and no end in sight. Furthermore, since an increasing tax burden, wild spending, and runaway inflation were not producing the utopian results everyone expected, popular resentment has followed in the form of a fiscal and social hangover.

Thus it would seem, (if the President can keep his mind on domestic matters for a sustained period, and unforeseen international problems notwithstanding), that the stage is set for a debate on what the future direction of this country should be.

The dismantlement of the Office of Economic Opportunity, as part of the Nixon Administration's government reorganization plan, has emerged as the focal point for the debate between Congress and the Executive. Synonymous with the war on poverty, OEO has not had a successful history. Its failure was characterized by overcentralization, and the top-heavy nature of the structure reflected a "support-the-rich-build-a-bureaucracy" approach to the problem of poverty. Funds which should have benefited the poor were used to pay the salaries of the War on Poverty Generals. And there were many instances in which 75 percent of expenditures for particular programs were administrative in nature.

Needless to say, as the Administration has pointed out, the war on poverty has not been eliminated; OEO's responsibilities are being shifted to other government agencies, with the exception of the Community Action Agencies. Through special revenue sharing programs, the states and local communities will have opportunity to determine the efficiency of their particular programs and the discretion to continue them in a way better

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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designed to meet their own needs. But OEO is the sacred shibboleth and symbol of the Great Society, and congressional opposition to its dismantlement is, therefore, strong.

Howard Phillips, a former Republican congressional candidate from Massachusetts who has long been associated with the arch-conservative Young Americans for Freedom, has been appointed to carry out the dismantlement of OEO. Phillips, to the chagrin of his congressional opponents, has made it clear that he enjoys this task and that he intends to be the last Director of OEO and not necessarily the best. Although it is the belief of many that the distinction of the former is a prerequisite for the latter.

The Washington press has given wide publicity to Phillips, a modern day Cato (as he cheerfully calls himself), bent on the destruction of Carthage. His "wrecking crew" and "gaulleiters," as they are invariably called, are equally pleased with their assignment. But as one of Phillips' conservative cohorts wryly observed to me, "the meeting of conservative minds here at OEO is not to be confused with the YAF reunion," which apparently is not to be held until later in the year.

Congressional reaction, in the form of the customary hot air, has been vociferous if nothing else. But little more has been forthcoming. In a leaked Administration memorandum, which received wide circulation here on Capitol Hill, the strategy for the successful conclusion to the dismantlement of OEO was laid out. OEO is to be dismembered by the end of Fiscal Year 1973 (June 30, 1973) before "congressional opposition to gather and develop a legislative counterstrategy" can be accomplished.

The Nixon Administration's memorandum serves to illustrate the dilemma with which Congress is faced. Although the first session of the 93rd Congress began on January 3, 1973, and the dismantlement of OEO is not to be completed until June 30th of this year (six months), it is considered doubtful by congressional observers that the languorous mechanisms of Congress can get in gear in time to meet this challenge. Congressional critics of the Administration, however, fear that the dismantlement of OEO could establish a dangerous precedent. They argue that it should be the responsibility of Congress, and not the Executive, to determine the nation's priorities and how the American tax dollar should be spent. This explains why the controversy has not taken on the ideological overtones one might expect, and many conservatives have indicated their opposition to the President's policies.

If the President is successful with his programs it might not only be the first step towards returning this country to the path of fiscal responsibility, but it might also eventually signal the reversal of the Great Society philosophy. However, as Irving Kristol in a recent column observed: "The '70s, as I sense their drift, will be years of assimilation and adaptation, of 'cooptation.' Big government is not going to go away, any more than pornography or abortions or women's lib will go away. These innovations may or may not have been altogether desirable. One may even think that, on balance, they have been altogether undesirable. But so far from their being repealed, they are on their way to being institutionalized—to being rendered conventional, un-subversive, in the end uninteresting (though not uninfluential). The result will be an America quite different—but not altogether different—from the America we have known." Kristol is undoubtedly correct in his summation of the seventies. But this does not make the present debate any easier, nor its outcome any more certain. □

Book Review

The Kennedy Promise

The Politics of Expectations
by Henry Fairlie
Doubleday $7.95

Is nothing sacred? Historical revisionists are dumping on Camelot and the Kennedy Clan! Where is Ted Sorensen when we need him most? The iconsmashers include British liberal Henry Fairlie as well as a gentleman named Halberstam (in the ironically-titled *The Best and the Brightest* and a certain Ms. Clinch (*The Kennedy Neurosis*), none of them coming from the long-critical Right. Both "charisma" and "options" seem destined for history's trash bin.

As Fairlie and others have noted, those Kennedy-idolaters who credit the Kennedys with being the dominant figures of the 1960s shouldn't absolve them from the nastiness of the decade. Fairlie's thesis is that the Kennedys were basically politicians who clothed their pursuit of power in lofty rhetoric, promised more than they could deliver, and raised expectations to such a pitch that when they were not satisfied by the political system, the system came under bitter attack.

JFK the politician has been obscured by JFK the martyr. Having out-spent his rivals to capture the Democratic candidacy for president in 1960, Kennedy ignored the half-dozen men he had hinted he would choose as vice-president to pick a running mate on pure political expediency. Campaigning in the Midwest in 1960, he wasn't above a little corn: "The American cow is the 'foster mother' to the human race and a great asset to the nation." Campaigning throughout the nation, he named the "Number One" problem in America to be, in various places: the depressed areas, the decline in farm income, and unemployment. Yet he told the readers of *Missiles and Rockets* magazine that "Certainly, national scientific goals will be our first objective." Part of his paper-thin margin over Richard M. Nixon (a politician of the period) was due to the "missile gap" JFK discovered, which JFK's Secretary of Defense debunked not too long after the campaign. Evidence abounds: John F. Kennedy was a masterful politician, politician, politician.

As Fairlie points out, the period of the fifties and sixties was one in which the intellectual elite was enthralled with the concept of the strong chief executive, a head of state who could wield the power of the federal government to do "good things" here and abroad. President Kennedy had long shared this view of the presidency. (It is good for a chuckle, by the way, to watch the current agonizing of the liberal senators who have only discovered the problem of a strong president when faced with one not doing what they want.) Fairlie cites Kennedy's pre-presidency belief in a strong leader as expressed in a speech in January, 1960 before the National Press Club: the chief executive "must be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word. He must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office — all that are specified and some that are not." In office, he urged us all to sacrifice for the country he led, "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country." If the appeal to patriotism wasn't enough, there were other appeals, such as to the desire to survive thermonuclear war. "Each day we draw nearer to the hour of maximum danger, as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger," President Kennedy told us in his State of the Union speech in 1961. We were in danger, but a good bit of that danger may have been due to the man who promised "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." Rather like a blank check drawn on the lives of the American people. Fairlie effectively contrasts this with Eisenhower's prescription for meeting the hostile ideology of communism: "To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crises, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint, the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle." Eisenhower promised less, yet would not have reneged on what he promised...One cannot imagine Ike refusing air cover at the Bay of Pigs because it would embarrass us at the U.N.

There were other forms of appeal for support of the President, to be sure. One of the most effective was the linking of JFK with "images of excellence": the dinners with artists, Nobel laureates, and the like; Robert Frost at the inauguration; the Cultural Gatherings which were to degenerate into radical chic parties by the end of the decade. Kennedy knew the value of image-making and quoted Burke to the effect that "...the whole world marks our demeanor." From the "philosopher-king" president down to the

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"philosopher-gladiators" at RAND, there were all these bright young Harvard grads speed-reading great books, speed-hearing great music, speed-viewing great art at all hours of the day and night and ruling the country besides. Fairlie protests, "Power is no doubt necessary; President Kennedy was allowed to make it seem desirable...."

What was done with the power? "Crises" were handled through the choice of appropriate "options." Unfortunately, John F. Kennedy believed it when he said, "Great crises produce great men." This is a very dangerous belief to be held by the president of the United States, especially by a president who adds in his brief tenure five divisions to the army and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force. Having this faith in the character-building efficacy of crisis, having beefed-up the military, and being concerned with image, such a president might ignore Senator Keating's warnings about the build-up of missile bases in Cuba until the situation seemed critical. Then such a president might scare the hell out of all of us by issuing a last-minute ultimatum to the Soviets that involved intercepting their ships on the high seas. Not allowing Castro to have nukes was wise; handling it "a minute before midnight" a bit risky. Crisis-management is not a good substitute for policy, although crisis options are usually simpler and more clear-cut than policy choices, and the mandate that eluded one in an election can be gotten temporarily in response to crisis. The rhetoric of crisis and mission has its uses, however: "If the zeal and the intelligence of the Kennedys were not to appear to be harnessed to personal ambition alone, they must be seen to be consecrated to a loftier and more strenuous ideal; and the nation, ennobled by their example, must consecrate itself in turn...."

The Eisenhower years seem now to have been years of tranquility. The Kennedy years brought promise and youth and vigor to the White House, and little in the way of legislative accomplishment. Johnson carried out what Kennedy started, in Vietnam and in a variety of domestic programs, yet he received the vilification of that constituency which had been John F. Kennedy's, the intellectual establishment. Kennedy's plans made real did not cure the ills of Americans, and Johnson and The System were blamed. Fairlie says it so well: Kennedy "in fact achieved so little that the people could hardly be blamed if they concluded that their political processes were inadequate to their tasks. If a leader of such exceptional vigor, commanding an administration of such unusual talents could not achieve his purposes, there must be something at fault with the political institutions which balked him. The fact that he was not, from day to day, exercising any political leadership within those institutions went unnoticed." The expectations raised by the Kennedy Administration far exceeded what they or any government could accomplish, and the disillusionment brought the erstwhile believers to the streets in the latter sixties.

Fairlie tries to dissociate the Kennedys' failures from those of liberalism, unconvincingly. The minds that wanted to bring their brand of the good life to nations all over the globe have tired of that, but not of imposing this vision on their fellow Americans. Kennedy, Johnson, McGovern — all were in tune with the *zeitgeist* of the liberal-intellectual elite of their times, and their failures were not merely due to their personal shortcomings. In Eisenhower's farewell address in which he warned us of the "military-industrial complex," he also warned against the distortions of education produced by government research contracts and "the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite." Quite prophetic.

Fairlie's book is well-written, engrossing, well-substantiated. It will do much to place the Kennedy years in proper perspective, and it helps explain the mood of many Americans today. The gap between promise and performance, between a *jihad* for freedom and the war in Indochina has proven disheartening. The author concludes about the American people, "Round and round they went, between 1961 and 1968, when they all fell down, tired of building nations, tired of stabilizing regions, tired of global conflict." The ability of government to increase the happiness of its citizens is very limited, and promises to that effect can lead only to failure, disillusionment, discontent, and upheaval.

D. W. Cooper

Book Review

Harry S. Truman

by Margaret Truman
Morrow $10.95

The Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset once remarked that a real hero is a person with the strength to be himself. Pretentiousness is usually self-deception, and hypocrisy is a sin unto oneself as well as others. To be president of the United States, in part responsible for the future of the world, yet maintain a sense of self-honesty as well as sanity, is a difficult task. Add to this the complex and mystifying role of father, and the man who can still be true to himself is a gifted and rare individual. Such a man was Harry S. Truman, as his daughter Margaret Truman Daniel attests in a recent collection of memories entitled *Harry S. Truman*. This sentimental biography is also a revealing and intimate portrait of a president.

Beginning with the election of 1948, Margaret Truman, largely from personal correspondence and recollection, retells her father's political career and reminisces about family life. She includes the Truman heritage, youthful experiences, military involvement in the First World War, short-lived business ventures, association with the Pendergasts, involvement in local politics, senate years and the Truman Committee, the Roosevelt-Truman ticket of 1944, the brief months as vice-president, the bequeathed presidency, termination of the war, postwar conferences, cold war origins and policy, and life in retirement. The scope of this book might indicate a long-involved political and psychoanalytical biography, but such is not the case. Margaret Truman is interested in portraying her father first as a man, then as the political leader. She is intent on describing human elements: emotions, convictions, loyalty, wit. She wants us to know that Harry S. Truman, burdened with enormous responsibilities yet considerate of the far-reaching effects of his decisions was moved by sincere intentions. This she illustrates by revealing the man known not as Mr. President but as "Dad."

In many ways Margaret Truman affirms her esteem for her father. His early criticism of Senator McCarthy for "reckless accusations" and "gutter tactics" confirms his hatred of demogoguery. His efforts in behalf of civil rights show a commendable dedication to equality and justice. His devotion to party loyalty as the bulwark of democracy is similarly laudable. His dismissal of General MacArthur is once more succinctly justified. The tribute paid to General George C. Marshall is a necessary acclamation of an often ignored but distinguished statesman. Truman's dim view of newspaper objectivity accurately foreshadows present-day controversy. And the unfortunate fact that President Roosevelt snubbed and belittled Truman perhaps best explains his being thrust into the presidency unprepared and ill-advised for the challenges which awaited him.

No one should expect this book to be objective. In fact, sentiment is what makes it delightful and enjoyable. Everyone smiles kindly upon a daughter who insists that "father knows everything." No one will fault Margaret Truman for justifying all her father's actions or concluding that her father was an exceptional man. The admiration, affection, and respect which she shows for her father is evidence enough

"SEEN AT THE PENTAGON, *shopping for a slightly used B-52: Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan. Seems the men of Liechtenstein have done it again: voted 2,128 to 1,675 (a much wider margin than two years ago) to deny women the vote. And the hell of it is, they don't export a single thing we could boycott.*"

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that Truman was a warm, understanding, sincere individual, at least as a father.

However exceptional Truman the man and father, this reviewer still hesitates to vindicate all the decisions of the thirty-third president, as his daughter assuredly does. If at times Margaret could forget her father was president, the world cannot. Nor can one escape the feeling that she has somehow lured the reader, with remarkable journalistic talent, into forgoing criticism or even doubts of Truman decisions and policy. Margaret Truman is perhaps as prejudiced against revisionist historians as they are narrow-minded toward her father. She ignores the fact that, as dedicated to peace as was her father, he made some contribution to the appearance of the cold war. Perhaps by misunderstanding Russia, or by understanding Stalin's intentions all too well, the policy of containment legitimized anti-Communist sentiment. It is unclear how Truman could have "specifically rejected the policy of containment" when that policy provided the philosophy of much postwar diplomacy.

This book abounds with examples of what is perhaps dramatic overstatement or exaggeration: devotion to fighting Russia, "the wily, determined foe" with an "arrogant thrust for world power"; "the cold-eyed men of the Kremlin"; "terrible Russia"; "The Russians continued to be impossible"; Henry A. Wallace's platform "would hand much of the world over to Joseph Stalin and Company"; Stalin sent orders to "seize power before the plan (Marshall Plan) would begin its restorative work"; force was "the only thing that Russians understood." Of course, Dad was accustomed to write the same way: "The Reds, phonies and the 'parlor pinks' seem to be banded together and are becoming a national danger"; "I'm sure Mr. Molotov is not so honest: He represents a totalitarian state—a police government"; "There's no telling what they'll do, if we don't put up a fight now."

Margaret Truman is intolerant of historians who cannot accept her father's decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan even if the motive was rapid termination of the war and the saving of lives. Perhaps this was a rationalization, or unpondered acceptance of the bomb as a legitimate weapon, or ignorance of the bomb's power. The fact that there was little consideration given to not using the bomb, Truman's statement years later that he'd do the same under similar circumstances, the belief that demonstration of the bomb was useless due to Japanese fanaticism, the psychological advantage that the nuclear monopoly might have provided in dealing with the Russians, and belief that the "rightness" of the decision "comes from the Japanese themselves": all these factors raise doubts about the president's decision.

I am not sufficiently confident or arrogant to defend the revisionists whom Margaret Truman assails. It is absurd to contend that President Truman alone caused the cold war and unprovable that it would have been avoided if he had followed another line. But if this book is more than a human interest story, if it is a refutation of revisionists and other historians critical of the Truman Administration, it fails to extinguish many of their questions concerning her father. Would the tension of the cold war have lessened if the Marshall Plan had done more than just "leaving the door open for the co-operation of Russia"? Was it expected that the Russians would not cry "deception" at the abrupt cancellation of Lend-Lease? How would the administration have reacted to the crises in Greece, Turkey, Korea, and China had they believed that the confrontations were not Soviet-directed? Had Truman fended off the "pressures from American Jews that he found personally very irritating," might an alternative to a Zionist state have precluded the bitter Middle East tensions of later years? How does one justify support for Syngman Rhee of South Korea "who tended to be ultra-conservative in his views and rather dictatorial in his methods"? Prophecy is useless and the number of ifs endless. Still, in this book the doubts which might accompany any assessment of Truman policy are sustained by nonrecognition of them.

Margaret Truman's biography of her father is at times exaggerated, defensive, bitter, perhaps vengeful. But it is a remarkable attempt to present her father as humble yet confident, loyal but independent, decisive though responsible, authoritative yet humane. She believes her father's talents have been misunderstood, even unappreciated. The energies of this fine book are directed toward undoing misconceptions. Its hope is to present a real person, above all a father. And though no reader should accept a view of omniscience and flawlessness, the author has succeeded in convincing us that Harry S. Truman was more than an automaton delegating authority, coldly setting policy, oblivious to human feelings and needs. He was a true hero, as Ortega y Gasset said, because he maintained, throughout his political career as throughout his private life, a self-integrity, honesty, and sincerity that permitted his daughter to see little difference between the man she called Dad and the man called Mr. President. The role of father can seem as demanding as that of president. Margaret Truman is the only judge of Truman's success as a father, and she says, without hesitation, that he was exceptional. It remains to be seen how history will judge him as president.

Joyce Goldberg

WEAVER

(Continued from page 4)

In any case, the curiosity of the human mind being what it is, many readers will probably still be reading despite my attempts to warn them that there was nothing to anticipate. Yet, for some reason which I do not claim to understand, some satisfaction may be derived from reading all this just the same. And those readers who have managed to bear with the article this far will probably read the rest of it too, provided that it does not grow to exaggerated proportions.

I am not so confident about the editor, however, and am beginning to wonder how much space I can reasonably expect him to provide for this article. After all, space is a precious commodity for editors, and I have little reason to expect that I will be allowed to continue much longer, considering that the space could just as well be delegated to articles on more pressing topics — or at least articles which have topics. Although there are many things I would like to add in this final paragraph, I do not want to press the editor's patience too much. So I have written these last sentences in such a way that he can cut as many of the ones at the end as he needs to. Perhaps my cooperative attitude will help convince him to let the bulk of the paragraph stand. That seems like a fair compromise. It should also be interesting for the reader because regardless of how much of the paragraph is printed, he will never know how many sentences were deleted. It also creates an interesting situation for me because I must now write every sentence as carefully as possible and hope that the editor will not wish to cut any of them. Surely if I become repetitious he will cut me off immediately. Yet how many sentences can I write in this vein without repeating something? Maybe if I stop now, and avoid padding the article, he won't cut anything.



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To the Editor:

James Grant's review of Tucker's **A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?** is quite inadequate. Mr. Grant fails to convey much of the logic and many of the assumptions which inform Tucker's position. I strongly disagree with Tucker. However, to dismiss him, as Grant does in essence, with the statement that "He has advocated what is probably an unwise course, but worse, he has not even done so for the right reasons," is unsatisfactory. Grant has not even told us what Tucker's "reasons" are!

To begin with, **A New Isolationism** is the latest in a trilogy of works by Tucker dealing with American foreign policy. The previous two volumes (**Nation or Empire?** and **The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy**) contain a great deal of the analysis supporting Tucker's argument for isolationism. For example, Tucker proclaims in **A New Isolationism** that the U.S. is not dependent on foreign resources to sustain our economy. The data which purportedly supports this claim is delineated in **The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.**

Mr. Grant does not comprehend Tucker's perception of the Cold War which forms an important part of the isolationist thesis. Grant observes that for Tucker the "Cold War . . . is over . . ." But Grant does not realize that Tucker is asserting that the Cold War should have been over ***two decades ago.*** Tucker does not believe that the Soviet Union has been an expansionist power since Stalin's death. In other words Tucker is a Cold War "revisionist" for the period from 1953 onwards.

Grant also fails to note Tucker's startling (particularly for a liberal) treatment of nuclear proliferation. Tucker acknowledges that proliferation would occur, in the most unlikely event that his proposals were adopted, but this does not worry him! Arguments are presented as to why Tucker believes we should not worry about proliferation.

Tucker's book, given the neo-isolationist mood in the U.S., is being widely discussed and assigned in American foreign policy courses. **A New Isolationism** requires a much more searching review and analysis than it has received from Mr. Grant.

Very truly yours,
J. Tim Fennell
Los Angeles, California

To the Editor:

It would be heartening if David Brudnoy were, as you stated, "national affairs commentator on WGBH-TV in Boston." The national affairs commentator on the show on which Mr. Brudnoy appears is Louis Lyons, a revered and passionate liberal. He is joined, nightly, by other liberals. Only after years of nagging and complaints to the FCC by unliberals was Mr. Brudnoy permitted to join the newscast. He appears on an infrequent basis. In all fairness, however, he is treated by Mr. Lyons and his staff with the self-congratulatory deference of a plantation owner to a field hand permitted to enter the mansion house on special holidays.

Not that Boston's "public" TV station doesn't welcome new regulars. For the past couple of years, a new face, that of Mike Dukakis, has regularly appeared as whipmaster of its nationally-syndicated hour-long show, "The Advocates." As a result of this priceless TV exposure, Mr. Dukakis is now a strong contender for the Governorship. He is a Democrat, and a liberal.

It was suggested to WGHB that Arvi Nelson, a young Conservative who piled up a startling vote running for Congress around Boston, share the time given to Mr. Dukakis. WGBH paid no attention to the suggestion. Any TV time Mr. Nelson needs, he must pay for.

Sincerely,
Al Capp
Boston, Massachusetts

To the Editor:

What is more disappointing than David Brudnoy's hackneyed misrepresentation of medieval Christendom ("Perspective on the Family and Homosexuality," February): Gary North's failure to present a serious, authentically Christian view of homosexuality. With an exotic mixture of cynicisms, North stumbles into black comedy: "The wages of sin are death," he writes with the self-assuredness of one born on the right side of the railroad tracks (or The Judgment Seat), "but God offers an advance on people's salary from time to time." North fails, however, to consider Christ's greatest commandment, charity, that we love and forgive the sinner (whether a liar, a thief, or a homosexual) no matter how hateful his offense.

Sincerely,
Joseph P. Duggan
St. Louis, Missouri

To the Editor:

It is with great grief that I must confess I have a "mentality alien to responsible conservatism." It is Mr. David Brudnoy I have to thank for this self-awareness. Upon reading in **National Review** that Brudnoy felt Ali McGraw was the most beautiful girl in the world, I breathed a sigh of relief in spite of the slur to Racquel Welch. That's when I realized I was old old-fashioned. You know . . . typically Hoosier.

Brudnoy's article in **The Alternative,** "Queer-baiting for Faith, Fun, and Profit" was enlightening. I always had an "uncompromising and relentlessly antagonistic" attitude toward the "morally degenerate homosexuals." Neanderthal. How un-understanding. And, horror of horrors, I felt sorry for them.

Brudnoy delineated Biblical teachings covering homosexuality. He explained that God knew nothing of modern psychiatry when he smote the Sodomites. That kind of concerned me since I had always thought God knew everything. What God said kind of, well, was law. It was His way or Hell.

This gospel according to Brudnoy is somewhat enticing. We can be intellectual. Listen to both sides. Have understanding. Dialogue. Do our own thing with no inhibitions. We can all sit around smoking joints and mock the ignorant close-minded Christians.

Throughout my years as a young conservative activist, upon reading an article such as Brudnoy's that I consider a threat to the principles which I believe in, I would now pick up my sword and ready myself for battle with the forces of evil. Only, when one realizes the forces of evil are supposedly one's allies, the fight within tends to transfer to frustration.

My hope for America no longer lies with the so-called intellectual conservative leaders. My hope dies with the plain folks of Bean Blossom and Gnaw Bone, Indiana. They may be ignorant but they ain't dumb. A 'homosexual man" is still a faggot.

Sincerely,
Mark Souder
University of Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana

To the Editor:

I want to take a brief moment to congratulate you on the inclusion of David Brudnoy's article in the February issue ("Queer-Baiting for Faith, Fun, and Profit"). Its appearance at this time is quite important for the "new conservatism" represented by such groups as **The Alternative** and YAF.

For too long, the stereotype of a concerned conservative was that of a young man or woman who, standing on a "soap-box," was best known for condemning government incursions into the lives of people. Unfortunately, that same person was always seemingly able to look the other way when government interfered in the private lives of those members of society with whom our young model conservative disagreed.

I am sure to some the advocacy of equal rights to all human beings — heterosexual **and** homosexual — portends the end of society as they know it. However, I have found that those most "uptight" are those who simply cannot practice the same thing that they preach. Advocacy of equal rights for homosexuals is not the advocacy of an increase in homosexual acts. The acts will go on among consenting adults whatever the law. It just seems a damn shame that our society makes criminals out of people for acts committed in the privacy of their own homes.

It is unfortunate for the "Gay Rights Movement" that the New Left has picked up their cause. A number of normally moderate or conservative people have been driven out of the conservative movement into the "residue of the Bomber Left" by our conservative brethren who, while writing pamphlets about the mind control of 1984ish Russia, continue to oppose laws that would allow people to live their own personal life styles — as long as they did not infringe on the rights of others.

I congratulate Professor Brudnoy on his hard-hitting article and hope that he opens some heretofore closed minds.

James A. Newman
Plains Regional Representative
Young Americans for Freedom
Faribault, Minnesota

To the Editor:

As an interested reader of **The Alternative,** I was dismayed to find an article which I consider to be far below your usual standards. I have just finished reading E. T. Veal's article "Booze and Pot: the Metaphysical Distinction." Mr. Veal's basic feeling about marijuana is one which I share; however, the mode he follows to prove his point is both false and dangerous. He states that "alcohol and marijuana are different things" and that "marijuana must stand on its own . . ." He then proceeds to attempt to prove the dangers of marijuana by **praising** many aspects of the consumption of alcohol.

Item: Marijuana users smoke pot at graduations; alcohol users do not drink.

Look more closely at any graduation, Mr. Veal. You'll find there either liquor or at least a number of people already high on it.

Item: Alcohol drinkers deplore the use of alcohol by teens and sub-teens. Marijuana users do not feel the same about marijuana.

Sorry, Mr. Veal. There **are** smokers who deplore its use by very young people; and, at the same time, there are parents who give their children alcoholic drinks at pre-school ages.

Item: Alcohol users go to a party for the party; marijuana users go for the high.

Sorry again, Mr. Veal. Have you ever asked people at a party if they would have come had there **not** been liquor there? I have. Try it. On the other hand, I have attended parties where marijuana was smoked casually and where the party, not the high, was the important occasion.

Item: (and I quote): "In the deepest folds of Bacchus, men see pink elephants. They are to the eye funny creatures, more likely to raise a smile than a whiff of terror."

Tell that to the parents of children killed by drunk drivers, Mr. Veal.

Let me state again that I share Mr. Veal's feeling that there are dangers in marijuana and that alcohol and marijuana are very different. But I am a non-drinker as well as a non-smoker, so not only could I give Mr. Veal some very convincing arguments about the "metaphysical distinctions" between pot and alcohol, but I could do so **without** praising the benefits or glossing over the disadvantages of either.

Mrs. Renee Utt
Bloomington, Indiana

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If you have ever been stirred and enlightened by the novels of Ayn Rand, George Orwell or Robert Heinlein, by the rigor and logic of the work in economics of Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, Henry Hazlitt and Murray N. Rothbard, by the biting social commentary of H.L. Mencken and Albert J. Nock, then you owe yourself an introduction to libertarianism.

It was Victor Hugo who gave us the unforgettable statement which describes libertarianism today: "There is one thing stronger than all the armies of the world: and that is an idea whose time has come." A young and dynamic movement that is spreading rapidly on college campuses and among intellectually alive men and women everywhere, libertarianism promises to be the one system that may succeed in reversing the unremitting growth of government and loss of individual rights; the one hope for restoring reason to its rightful place in our social, academic and political institutions.

An understanding of libertarianism, then, is critical to those who wish to understand how a better world can be built tomorrow. And here we offer the three books which we believe provide the best possible introduction:

LIBERTARIANISM by John Hospers, the distinguished chairman of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, provides a comprehensive, but non-technical introduction to the subject. Drawing on such writers as Ayn Rand, Ludwig von Mises and Henry Hazlitt, Hospers integrates the most forceful libertarian arguments into a coherent case ranging in issues from individual rights to international relations, from welfare to ecology. The book is a virtual encyclopedia that deals with almost every objection to a free market and a free society.

RADICAL LIBERTARIANISM: A RIGHT WING ALTERNATIVE by Jerome Tuccille concentrates on the aspect of libertarianism with which he is most familiar: the fragmentation of the American right-wing into two distinct camps, traditionalist conservatives and libertarians. Tuccille presents the essentials of libertarianism more succinctly, but no less persuasively than does Prof. Hospers. And in addition, Tuccille includes an important and interesting history of the initial development of libertarianism as a self-conscious "movement."

THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY is F.A. Hayek's *magnum opus*, a massive and searching analysis of the philosophy of liberty. This volume examines the nature of liberty and coercion, and its relationship to the state, focusing on why man needs liberty. Beyond that, Hayek discusses the nature and applications of the rule of law in political society and ends by applying his premises to an examination of many contemporary political and economic problems. This is the most rigorous development of one great school of thought within libertarian circles.



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The Bootblack Stand

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at *avant-garde* bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled *What's in It for Me?* Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

I have been an activist for the women's movement for a very long time. My wife calls me the Abraham Lincoln of Pretty Feet. In fact, now that the war is over, she is throwing her considerable weight into the women's movement by setting out on a circumcision of the globe in a little boat.

Now if we are to truly liberate the sexes in this country it seems to me that men are going to have to be able to join women's organizations. In fact, we should probably force men into women's organizations at least to fill certain goals. Have you any suggestions?

Regards,
Senator Philip Hart

Dear Senator Hart:

I spotted you years ago as a forward-looking solon of the old school, a fitting sequel to Robert La Follette. Yes, by all means men should be forced into women's organizations. I suggest that you take the lead by joining La Leche, the women's organization which advocates natural breast feeding.

GWP

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

My chances of winning the presidency this year seem hopeless. I took your advice and in kicking off my campaign for the 1973 Democratic presidential candidacy I championed the civil liberties of a sorely oppressed group, that being the precious liberties of U.S. senators. I chose to defend them against those weirdo pre-flight searches by sick airport security guards whose eager hands make me feel personally like a defenseless muskmelon or something.

I made at least one memorable statement in *The New York Times*: "As a person I do not object to a search. As a senator, I do object." In fact I have gotten quite a lot of publicity. I am now asked to speak before many distinguished groups like the Clyde City Mental Health Association, The Society of Jesters of Greenwich Village, the Paducah Lodge for Disabled and Demented Pig Farmers, Richard Speck, the Wilmette League of Women Voters, the National Association of Melon Growers, and The New Politics Coalition of Palm Beach. But none of the Democratic clubs of New Hampshire or any of the other primary states seems interested in me. I am never going to win the 1973 presidential race. Now where do I turn?

Cordially,
R. Vance Hartke

Dear Mr. Hartke:

Turn yourself in to the authorities you nitwit before you do yourself harm. There *is* no presidential campaign this year. And out of reverence for the American political system I am not going to tell you when the next one comes up. I have always thought you one of the biggest blockheads in the Senate. This last stunt proves it. From now on even Senator Gravel takes a back seat to your genius.

GWP

Book Review

The Rivals

America and Russia Since World War II
by Adam Ulam
Compass Viking $2.95 pb.

It would be pleasant to say that Adam Ulam's new book, now available in a paperback edition, has all the answers to its grand subject, the first quarter century of American-Russian relations since the end of the Second World War. Of course it does not. And yet it contains a good many acceptable answers. The author has spent much time studying Soviet Russian foreign policy; he tends to be opinionated and iconoclastic; sometimes he is too analytic, inclined to see order or thought where there may not have been much; but he brings information, intelligence, and lively prose to his points and the result is always interesting, at times fascinating.

Relations between the two rivals divided conveniently into the years from 1945 to 1950, the fifties, and the sixties, and Ulam's opinions of policy during these three eras are never in doubt. For the first period, when the cold war heated up, he considers the forces behind policy to have been Soviet malevolence and American fear, the latter based on an overestimate of Russian strength. During the fifties Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' prose style obscured the increasing subtleties of Soviet policy, the sometimes involuted calculations of Nikita Khrushchev who out of increasing concern for the Chinese wanted friendship with the United States. Then in the sixties, after the missile crisis, American policy slipped into irrelevance because of preoccupation with Vietnam. The Soviets were happy to see the Americans in trouble in a corner of Asia. There was even a modest cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, for the Chinese were likewise happy to see the Americans humbled.

What can one agree with in Ulam's book? Perhaps the best part of the book is the framework, the general analysis. The reader may well be wary of some of the supporting detail. Ulam probably is showing hindsight when he stresses the Soviets' economic and military weakness in the immediate postwar years. The Truman Administration was itself weak; in domestic politics it was in a confusing situation, and for foreign policy there was little conventional military strength. The President was unsure of election in 1948. He managed that hurdle, contrary to most of the guesses of the time, but then a year and a half later the Korean War began and Truman once more had his hands full. It is easy in retrospect to point out Soviet weakness during the Truman era. Then consider the essentially conservative nature of American foreign policy during the past quarter century, the years since 1945. In a theoretical manner it is fairly easy to say something should have been otherwise, but then so many mistakes would have been possible, especially beginning in 1952 or 1953 when there was a virtual equality in nuclear arms between the United States and the USSR. The historian can be thankful that policy proved as sensible as it did.

At the same time it is attractive to read about alternatives. American-Russian relations since 1945 have often been costly in lives and treasure—a hundred thousand American, not to mention Asian, lives, and defense budgets are approaching the astronomic. It may be that the better is the enemy of the good, but one wonders whether courses other than a careful conservatism might have worked better. In wondering the first move should be to accumulate information. Hence the reason for reading this book. The author in a footnote to his concluding chapter properly remarks that "an informed and dispassionate mind is the first and perhaps the most fundamental condition of the individual's contribution to social improvement."

Robert H. Ferrell

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FERRELL
(continued from page 14)

ment was to propel Stettinius into the United Nations.[32] Byrnes talked tough within administration circles (not openly to the Russians) in the summer of 1945, and the revisionists have found several good quotations to show that he was no naif. But contrary to the revisionists, Byrnes' views on Russian-American relations in 1945 are difficult to pin down. Probably the highly intelligent Jimmy was himself unsure of his position, as was true of most Americans at the time. Underneath his geniality he did not like to be pushed around, as no one likes to, and he had the impression, which was as good as true, considering what the Russians were doing in Eastern Europe, that the Soviets were being extremely difficult. But then in the autumn and winter of 1945-1946, Byrnes appears to have gotten so weak on the Russian question that, so Truman in a famous section of his memoirs would contend, he, the President, had to bawl out the Secretary of State for "babying" the Soviets. Byrnes denied this allegation and there is not the slightest reason to doubt the denial. The point is that in Byrnes the revisionists clearly are dealing with no doctrinaire on the Russian question, and what does that fact do to some of their hard-line commentaries about Byrnes' machiavellian influence on the inexperienced President? Moreover, the Byrnes papers at the Clemson University library have just (1971) been opened, and it would behoove the revisionists, who have written at great length about Byrnes' baneful influence, to take a look at the private correspondence.

It would be possible to relate in detail the evidence, which is undeniable, that Roosevelt was hardening his own view of the Russians just before his death,[33] but suffice to say of the point that Truman reversed Roosevelt's policy that it is at the least unproved and that most signs point in the direction of continuity.

In considering the responsibility of leading personalities there seems much more reason to believe that Stalin, rather than Truman, forced the cold war, though the reasoning for that conclusion must be widely open to debate. Perhaps the Jacques Duclos letter of April, 1945, was a communist declaration of war on the West, though perhaps it was not.[34] Perhaps Stalin was mad; perhaps he was not, although of his later madness there is excellent testimony by N. S. Khrushchev. As Melvin Croan, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, remarked at a scholarly conference in London some years ago, the internal compulsions of the Soviet state in 1945 — the political unreliability of large sections of the Soviet people, the need to force a rebuilding of Soviet industry after the war's devastation — made it highly convenient, maybe even necessary, for Stalin to have an external enemy, for him to have a cold war.[35] And anyway, nothing short of the conversion of the United States into a satellite would have sufficed to abolish Stalin's distrust. Even that might not have sufficed, considering the manner in which he could assail his closest friends, or states with the most friendly political systems, for some mythical deviation or other.

A second hypothesis of the revisionists, concerning diplomacy during the year

1945, on which they have shown considerable agreement, is that after the Yalta Conference the American government sought to intervene in Russia's security zone in Eastern Europe, trying to gain influence, perhaps even dominance, over the *cordon sanitaire* of weak nations lying between Western Europe and the Soviet borders. Henry Wallace was saying in 1946 that the United States was being self-righteous in trying to force its way into a supervision of the politics of the Eastern European nations, that Russian "efforts to develop a security zone in Eastern Europe . . . are small change from the point of view of military power as compared with our air bases in Greenland, Okinawa, and many other places thousands of miles from our shores." Walter Lippmann soon was pointing to a double standard, that at the end of the war the Anglo-Americans had dominated the reorganization of the Italian government. Stalin in a cable to Truman in 1945 had remarked that he had not sought to intervene in the politics of Belgium or Greece. What to the revisionists has seemed the height of the Truman Administration's hypocrisy in trying to give the Soviets advice on Eastern Europe was the telephone conversation on May 8, 1945, between John J. McCloy, present at the San Francisco Conference, and Secretary Stimson, in the course of which these two administration stalwarts agreed that the United States could maintain its sphere of influence in Latin America and still reasonably ask the Soviets for concessions in Eastern Europe; McCloy and Stimson spoke of having their cake and eating it too, a metaphor not soon forgotten by their critics of the 1960s.

The revisionists have pointed out that President Roosevelt during the war had tried to avoid talk of division of Europe or the world into spheres of influence, and favored a kind of universalism which, some of the revisionists have said, was naught but the open door for American commerce. The revisionists have noted that this presidential strategy of delaying decisions about the postwar political map had its special advantage in Eastern Europe, the homeland of large numbers of the Democratic party's supporters. It is true that Roosevelt at Teheran told Stalin that he hoped there would be no decision on the map of Eastern Europe until after the 1944 presidential election and mentioned the Polish problem in particular. There is no question but that the strategy of delaying the drawing of postwar boundaries and establishment of political regimes allowed Roosevelt to avoid telling the American people, especially his Polish supporters, some hard truths about what the Red Army might do in the regions it occupied — although in the Polish case the outrageous behavior of Stalin in refusing to send the Red Army across the Vistula to assist the Warsaw uprising in 1944 while the Germans blew up the city, block by block, should have carried a message to any American Poles who wondered about the postwar policies of the Soviets. At Yalta, Roosevelt then almost openly gave in to the Russians in regard to boundaries and politics and human rights in Eastern Europe, and when Admiral Leahy protested FDR said there was nothing the United States could do. He glossed over his inability to change things by arranging the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, and the revisionists are quite right in pointing out also that the terms for operation of the Allied Control Councils in the occupied territories gave complete control to Soviet troops.

After an initial angry outburst at Molotov, Truman accepted this state of affairs, as well he might have, the revisionists to the contrary. As the Soviet Union in the next two years committed outrage after outrage in Eastern Europe the protests that issued from Washington were protests and could be nothing more, though the revisionists interpret them as efforts at interference, failing to

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32. **Loc. cit.**; also the important analysis in Richard L. Walker and George Curry, **Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and James F. Byrnes** (New York, 1965). Curry's account deserves careful attention, for he based it on close personal consultation with Byrnes and also had the run of the Byrnes papers. Prior to publishing in the **American Secretaries** series Curry had assisted the Secretary in research and writing of the autobiography.

33. To the chagrin of the revisionists, Schlesinger in "Origins of the Cold War," p. 24n, published an account of a conversation between Anna Rosenberg Hoffman and FDR on March 24, 1945, the last day Roosevelt spent in Washington. After luncheon the President was handed a cable, read it, and became quite angry. He banged his fists on the arms of his wheelchair and said, "Averell is right; we can't do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta." See also the article in **The New York Times**, Mar. 27, 1972, by Francis L. Lowenheim, printing a hitherto unpublished cable from FDR to Churchill, dated Apr. 6, 1945.

34. "Frere Jacques" Duclos, the Comintern official in charge of the western communist parties, in **Cahiers du Communisme** for April, 1945, launched an attack on the American Communist party, condemning Earl Browder's revisionism. Schlesinger in "Origins of the Cold War" says that he could not have planned and written this piece much later than the Yalta Conference, and hence it shows that Stalin was turning against the West well before the incidents the revisionists often cite to demonstrate American responsibility for the cold war. The revisionists refuse to believe this, and stress the unimportance or Schlesinger's misinterpretation of the letter.

35. "Origins of the Post-War Crisis – a Discussion," **Journal of Contemporary History**, vol. 3 (1967-1968), 233-237, excerpted in Paterson, ed., **Origins of the Cold War**, p. 112.

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understand the President's political problem in dealing with such senators as Vandenberg of Michigan who had a large group of Polish constituents, failing also to understand the need for any decent human being to speak out against the repression behind the iron curtain. The revisionists as moral men speak out against the present war in Vietnam, but they cannot understand similar efforts by the United States government for the suffering peoples of Eastern Europe. Should one mention again the phrase "double standards"?

Herbert Feis believed in retrospect that the western allies should have risked a break with Stalin at Yalta, rather than make the Eastern European agreements, but the bleakness of the western position emerges clearly in Feis' estimate of the result in such a case — "I think that if they had taken that risk, Stalin would have given in slightly about Poland."[36]

What in retrospect strikes one as peculiar about the situation in Eastern Europe is not that the Soviets feared an open door to American trade and hence erected barriers to American capitalism (it never seems to have bothered them much), nor that the Americans saw Soviet domination as the camel's head of socialism under the tent of Western Europe (there is not much American official testimony in this regard), nor that the Russians were sensitive about the politics of the states along their borders (undoubtedly this was the case), but that the Soviets found it necessary to make the Eastern European countries utterly subservient to Russian rule, when they had the example of Finland, a little country that behaved and paid its reparations on time, or Czechoslovakia until 1948 which likewise showed careful appreciation for Soviet sensibilities. Apparently the Russians, for all their supposed political savvy, could not understand the impossibly weak position of the little countries of Eastern Europe, and came to think that even a small evidence of democracy was dangerous. Stalin made the well-known remark at Potsdam that "any freely elected government would be anti-Soviet and that we cannot permit," but was this really a smart observation? There is either a doctrinaire politics here, or the operation of an irrational will, which in either case belies the assertions of the revisionists that an American policy of universalism, in particular the open door in Eastern Europe, was a major reason for the origins of the cold war.

The military advantage of an Eastern European *cordon sanitaire* proved to be slight. The satellite armies were unreliable, and after Soviet and American acquisition of medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missles in the 1950s and 1960s the territory of the satellites possessed no discernible military value.

The revisionists have advanced a third theory about American foreign policy during 1945 and the origins of the cold war, that the American government dropped two atomic abombs on the Japanese not so much to end the war, which was coming to a finish anyway, but to impress the Russians who were giving trouble in Eastern Europe; it is pleasant indeed to be able to relate that the brouhaha over Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* which began with publication of that sensational volume in 1965 is now virtually at an end.[37] Most of the revisionists have so hedged their acceptance of Alperovitz's thesis as almost to remove it from sight, and Alperovitz himself has retired from the scene of his triumph, or near-disaster, and turned to other things. In the preface to his collection of his essays published in 1970 he related that they were his last on foreign policy and that he hoped "to help edit a reader and perhaps help devise some ways to constrain policy, by making it more responsive to popular sentiment . . . my future work will be concerned almost exclusively with domestic policy matters and with efforts to transform the political economy of our domestic institutions."[38]

The truth was that after making a large impression with a dramatic thesis, and after engaging in several polemical articles in *The New York Review of Books* and so irritating Herbert Feis that the latter in his book on the origins of the cold war refused to mention the author of *Atomic Diplomacy* by name, Alperovitz could not prove his major contention. Adam Ulam in a caustic analysis of "Dr. Alperovitz" has written that "one would expect Alperovitz to adduce at least a single instance of an American negotiator saying in effect to a Russian during the period in question (1945-46), 'You ought to remember we have the bomb,' or 'If you go easy on the Poles we might share our nuclear know-how with you.' Or he might offer a *public* statement by an American official that 'the Russians ought to keep in mind before they go too far in Rumania that we have this weapon.' Dr. Alperovitz does not cite any such instances because there weren't any."[39] His supporters were reduced to saying that Alperovitz had widened their horizens, making them see that some officials in the American government did believe that the atomic bomb might help them in their troubles with the Russians. Alperovitz found himself reduced to psychology, claiming that possession of the bomb influenced American officials more than they knew or said. In a sideways movement in one of his *New York Review* essays Alperovitz also took refuge in logic. American military leaders, he remarked, believed the bomb unnecessary for victory over Japan, and the American government failed to reassess the military situation, and why did "the momentum remain when the military reasons disappeared?" (Answer: "In short, a *diplomatic* momentum had by this time taken control of policy.")[40]

By this time half of the graduate students in the country were believing Alperovitz and the other half were looking for holes in his argument, and one of the latter at the University of Tennessee found that where Alperovitz had claimed that on June 18, 1945, Truman's military advisers had agreed that Japan could be forced to surrender unconditionally without use of the bomb and without an invasion (and the diplomatic momentum was, therefore, about to set in), and had quoted General Marshall as saying that "The impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation ...",[41] he had trimmed the quotation so as to give it a quite different meaning from what Marshall intended. But just as the Tennessee sharpshooter was about to draw a bead on Alperovitz, the *enfant terrible* of 1965 was, as mentioned, rapidly disappearing over the historical horizon.

(continued next month)

36. **From Trust to Terror**, p. 26.

37. The publisher of Alperovitz was Simon and Schuster.

38. **Cold War Essays**, p. 4.

39. "On Modern History: Re-reading the Cold War," excerpted in Paterson, ed., **Origins of the Cold War**, p. 115.

40. **Cold War Essays**, p. 3. The psychology is on p. 71: "Thus it appears that the natural military assumption that the bomb would be used became intermeshed with diplomatic strategy in a way so subtle it was probably not completely understood by the participants themselves."

41. Alperovitz needs to show that there was no military justification for the bomb; this is his key piece of evidence, because it would mean that President Truman obviously had ulterior reasons for using atomic weapons. On pp. 237-238 of **Atomic Diplomacy**, Alperovitz writes as follows: **"...before the atomic bomb was dropped each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that it was highly likely that Japan could be forced to surrender unconditionally, without use of the bomb and without an invasion.** (Alperovitz's emphasis.) Indeed, this characterization of the position taken by the senior military advisers is a conservative one. General Marshall's June 18 appraisal was the most cautiously phrased advice offered by any of the Joint Chiefs: 'The impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation...' " The ellipsis points at the end of this quotation are Alperovitz's. after which he passes to the opinion of Admiral Leahy. For the quotation from Marshall, Alperovitz cites to the Potsdam documents in **Foreign Relations.** But from a careful reading of **Foreign Relations: the Conference of Berlin, 1945, I** (Washington, 1960, 905, the same page used by Alperovitz, it is clear that Marshall anticipated the necessity of American troops landing on Kyushu, an operation then being planned for November 1, and that it might even be necessary to land troops on Honshu, the island containing Tokyo, which latter landing eventually was scheduled for April 15, 1946. Following is a properly full quotation of Marshall's opinion (in the document the general was reading, the designation "Japan" meant the Honshu landing): "There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. . . .(Ellipsis marks in original). An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation **at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan."** Alperovitz omitted these final, emphasized words, and failed to print the preceding two sentences, moving the quotation completely out of context. I am greatly indebted to John Garry Clifford of the University of Connecticut, who in 1968-1969 taught at Tennessee and devoted part of a seminar to the Alperovitz book, for calling my attention to this quotation.

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"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripides

Current Wisdom

THE AMERICAN CENTURY

Mr. Jimmy Breslin, scholar, introduces Mr. Norman Mailer, bard, at a New York birthday party commemorating the latter's first half-century of floor flushing:

(Mailer is) a man whose words will be read a hundred years from now. The best of our time.

—The Washington Post

THE PRINCE OF PEACE

The state of the moral imagination in suburban Wynnewood, a citadel of righteousness just outside heathen Philadelphia:

The Rev. Philip J. Berrigan, an antiwar militant priest who was released from jail in December, has described America's returning prisoners of war as "war criminals."

"We are overpublicizing the war criminals that are coming home," the 49-year-old priest told a dinner Saturday in suburban Wynnewood.

"But what else could we expect from the government, but to distort the true nature of the men? The returning prisoners are just what Nixon would want them to be, but they're going to have to come to terms with themselves."

—The Chicago Tribune

JANE FONDA TELLS ALL

Numinous revelation of the peace movement's most precious mind:

About three years ago I wasn't even sure where Vietnam was. When I was in college I didn't read the newspaper; I was completely apathetic but I know now that apathy comes from not seeing any way out.

The Bryn Mawr-Haverford College News

THE LIFE OF THE MIND

Ellen Willis, old-fashioned girl, applies her powerful analytical mind to the metaphysical perversions of a famous pornographic film and explicates all:

Movies like "Throat" don't turn me on, which is, after all, what they are supposed to do. On the contrary, I find them a sexual depressant, partly because they are so unimaginative, partly because they objectify women's bodies and pay little attention to men's — American men are so touchy about you-know-what — but mostly because they deliberately and perversely destroy any semblance of an atmosphere in which my sexual fantasies could flourish. Furthermore, I truly can't comprehend why they excite other people — a failure of empathy that leads straight into the thickets of sexual polarization.

—The New York Review of Books

FROM THE ACADEMY

The illustrious Washington Post **interviews Dr. Warren Farrell, professor of urban politics at Rutgers University, male activist in the National Organization for Women, liberated male, intellectual giant, visionary, expounder of the abstruse, sex symbol, and one of the first American males in history to bill Blue Cross for a pap smear:**

Farrell is married to a woman who got her graduate degree in mathematics at Harvard and who now manages a team of seven men and three women at IBM. Farrell says he is liberated enough not to be threatened by her "excessive intelligence" and ability. However, he says, "if I were totally liberated, I wouldn't mind wearing a dress instead of a tie, or, I'd be able to relate to men sexually, which I can't." Asked if to be totally liberated one has to be bisexual, Farrell said, "I'm not sure. But I certainly feel totally liberated men should be able to touch each other, hug, to be able to kiss, to cry. That's where the liberation movement is at — breaking down the whole male value system and getting men to adopt the best of traditionally female values such as being able to accept crying as a valid expression of emotions. Why should Muskie have been crucified for crying in New Hampshire?"

—The Washington Post

THE GOLDEN RULE

Brother Stokely Carmichael notes the progress of racial harmony in these United States:

We should understand that Brother Essex carried our struggle to the next quantitative level, the level of science.

—The Newark News

THE GREAT CONSPIRACY

The incomparable Madam Van Horne views the POWs' homecoming with her famous and unfailing percipience. Nixon is at it again:

If there was a single jarring note in the homecoming scene, it wasn't in the cheers of the crowd that had waited for eight hours in the hot sun, nor in the hearty handshake of the tall, bronzed admiral in his immaculate whites. No, it was in the repeated and careful "thank you's" to President Nixon, also referred to, somewhat unnaturally, as "my Commander-in-Chief."

Now these effusions of thanks may have been entirely spontaneous. There may have been no prompting by the military escort that brought the men home. There may have been no hortatory editorials in the issue of Stars and Stripes given each man aboard the repatriation flight.

—The New York Post

ENGLISH SPOKEN HERE

The beauties of English as spoken at the modern Chicago Tribune, **the Times of the prairies:**

Vodny Trahsport recounted the saga of the Lift-200, a machine built years ago by the Leningrad Institute of Water Transport. It cost $240,000 then, and its purpose was to offload cement from ships.

—The Chicago Tribune

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The heroic missive of a conscience-bound American, who but for the vagaries of fate, could well be the editor of the Washington Post.

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Most Americans are earnestly and sincerely seeking a way to stop the trend toward Socialism and Communism that we are seeing day after day. How can we ever stop the enemy unless we at least know what it is? Just what *is* in back of Communism? Just *who are* the persons, *what are* the movements in on this treacherous scheme? Wouldn't you like to know, at last, the answers to these questions? Wouldn't you like to know the *big picture*, the *grand design* of it all?

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Both "The Union Jack" and "And Men Wept" (they go together like ham and eggs) will be sent upon receipt of $10 (postpaid). Order from Christian Exercise. No payment will be returned (this to prevent the enemy from wasting our time and effort.) After reading them, you will be grateful for the enlightenment contained therein. And, you will be free, in that you will know, at last, the secret of all secrets. You shall know the truth! (Notice: Cecil Rhodes confidential letter will appear in next newsletter of CHRISTIAN EXERCISE: P.O. Box 90091, Nashville, Tenn. 37209

Remember: There is only *one* conspiracy "*British-Israel.*"

—A Confidential Mailing

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THE CONTINUING CRISIS

(continued from page 2)

thought the charge might be false, but he had "been into some bad cheese lately, and he thought oh what the hell." In the Washington news briefs, Senator Hartke's office denied that the Senator suffers catatonic trances during which he is helplessly invalided for days, unable to remove his foot from his mouth. Senator Javits' wife appeared at Norman Mailer's birthday party sniffing glue. And Senator Mike Gravel has asked for special permission to bring his Sony portable television set onto the Senate floor. Tragedy struck Rep. Wright Patman when doctors ordered him to restrict his talking to a minimum lest he damage his throat irreparably. Rep. Ron Dellums and fourteen colleagues are preparing legistation to be introduced before the House Committee on Educational Labor making English a foreign language in all American universities receiving federal subsidies. Representative Paul McCloskey is preparing legislation to demand an immediate halt in the bombing and an end to the war in Indochina.

●News from the Heartland: Reverberations of the Serrano decisions were felt in Chicago where the progressive Mayor, Richard J. Daley, ordered elimination of pay toilets at that city's three airports. Directors of the United States Jaycees overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to admit women. Dr. Opel Merriwether of Racoon, Illinois is urging the AMA to reintroduce bleeding as a cure for nervous tension. Dr. Merriwether believes that his research shows that nervous tension is the result of static electricity that is picked up in the blood by "people who wear orlon." Israeli pilots downed a Libyan civil jetliner flying mysteriously close to a secret Israeli air base. Final plans were fabricated for U.S.-Chinese liaison offices in Washington and Peking. Illinois' ex-Governor Kerner was sent to the calaboose for accepting bribes while governor. And AFL-CIO President George Meany gave Democratic Chairman Robert Strauss the old cold sniff. □

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